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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The classical dichotomy between the real and monetary variables 
in the economy is, in one form or another, an extremely hardy beast. 
One of its milder reincarnations is the idea that an examination of 
the determinants of the stock of money is, at best, only an intellectual 
game since the chain of causality runs from income and prices to the 
money stock. The demand for money is visualized as primarily a function 
of the level of national income and any correlation between income and 
prices and money is due solely to the "pull" of income on the money 
stock. No important feedback from the money stock to income and 
prices are believed to exist. 
With the great deal of work done in the 1950's and early I960's 
providing a convincing theoretical basis for the existence of a chain 
of causality running from the money stock to the real variables in 
2 
the economy (not to mention Keynes' work (31, 32)), economists began, 
in the early 1960's, to investigate more thoroughly the determination 
of the money stock. The forces affecting the money stock were important 
since the money stock in turn affected the level of prices and income. 
The primary purpose of this work is to examine the processes through 
which the money stock is determined. In addition, we will provide further 
^See for example. Goldsmith (26), Klein, L. and Goldberger, A. (33). 
2 Patinkin's, Money, Interest, and Prices (47), served as both a 
milestone and a stimulus for further work in this area. 
2 
theoretical support for the position that changes in the stock of money 
affects the level of economic activity, and will examine the effects 
and effectiveness of the various tools of monetary policy. The framework 
in which this will be carried out is a general equilibrium model of 
the economy composed of five sectors—the public, manufacturing firms, 
banks, nonbank financial firms, and the government. 
Review of the Literature 
This work is primarily an extension of what is commonly referred 
to as "money supply theory." The basic idea of the approaches to be 
discussed is to generate expressions for the stock of money in terms 
of the variables of whatever economic model is postulated and to derive 
statements about the effects of changes in these variables on the stock 
of money. These expressions for the money stock are called money supply 
equations.^ 
The study of the supply of money began with the early work of C. 
A. Phillips (48) and others (1, 35, 39, 50) in the 1920's and 1930's. 
Their work culminated in the standard textbook money multipliers like 
AM = (-^) times the original change in the money stock (where r is the 
average reserve requirement) with which we are so familiar. No real 
X 
They are not supply equations in the normal sense of the term, 
since they all purport to give the actual stock of money when the values 
of their parameters are known. If they were true supply equations, the 
actual stock of money would be given, not by the "supply" equation alone, 
but by simultaneous solution of the aggregate demand for money equation 
and a "true" supply equation. For this reason, we choose to speak of 
the monetary mechanism implying a simultaneous determination of the 
money stock, rather than the supply of money alone. 
3 
advance in this area occurred until the I960's and the work of Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz (24), Phillip Cagan (10), and Karl Brunner 
and Alan Meltzer (4, 5, 6, 8, 41). The Friedman-Schwartz-Cagan approach 
and the Brunner-Meltzer approaches to the money supply are the best 
known today and are described in detail below. 
The Friedman-Schwartz-Cagan^ approach is based on two simple def­
initions. The money stock, M, is equal to total currency holdings, C, 
and total demand deposits. 
M = C + D (1.2-1) 
High powered money, H, defined as the total of all types of money 
that can be used as currency or reserves is simply 
H = C + R (1.2-2) 
where R is simply reserves. 
The basic Friedman-Schwartz-Cagan result is obtained by singly 
dividing Equation 1.2-1 by Equation 1.2-2 which yields, after a few 
2 
simple algebraic manipulations, 
^Cagan's tautology for the money stock is slightly different from 
that presented in Appendix B to A Monetary History of the U. S., 1867-1960 
by Friedman and Schwartz (24). Cagan's formulation is based on the 
tautology derived by Friedman and Schwartz described in the text. 
o w G+D 
The derivation of Equation 1.2-3 is: (1) — = Multiplying 
n. 2^ 
numerator ana denominator by D yields (2) ~ ^^en the right 
RC 
hand side of 2 is multiplied by —, yielding 
DÇjs! DC D+D! D , D) 
M ^  RC ^ RC RC _ R RC _ R ^  C^ 
H DC+RD DC . RD ~ D . D ~ D/R + D/C ' 
"RT RC "^RC R +C 
Multiplying both sides by H gives the desired result. 
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Equation 1.2-3 is a tautology, being derived from the definitions 
of M and H. In this approach the money stock is determined by the 
decisions of three sectors: the government who determines H; the public 
by determining their deposit to currency ratio, D/C; and the banks by 
determining the deposit to reserve ratio, D/R. Friedman and Schwartz 
call H, D/R, and D/C the "proximate determinants" of the money stock.^ 
The factors underlying these proximate determinants are spelled out only 
vaguely. D/C is said to depend upon the "relative usefulness" of 
deposits and currency, the costs of holding these assets, and "perhaps 
2 income." D/R is a function of legal reserve requirements and 
3 
precautionary reserves. The determinants of H are not spelled out 
specifically, even though a large portion of thei- book is devoted 
to describing and analyzing various actions by the monetary authorities. 
Brunner and Meltzer actually present two hypotheses--a linear and 
a nonlinear hypothesis. Their linear hypothesis is based on the reaction 
of the banking system to the presence of surplus reserves, defined as 
the difference between actual and desired reserves, the portfolio 
adjustments caused by these surplus reserves, (4, 8), and the process 
by which surplus reserves are generated or absorbed. 
^Friedman and Schwartz, op.cit., p. 791, 
^Ibid., p. 787. 
\bid., p. 785. 
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The total portfolio response of the banking system to the presence 
of surplus reserves is given by 
dE = : (1-2-4) 
where E is the value of the banks portfolio, S is the amount of surplus 
reserves, and X is the average loss coefficient (e.g., \ measures the 
amount of surplus reserves lost per dollar of portfolio adjustment) . 
A is less than one since the banking system will generate added deposits 
(and thus reserves) as it attempts to eliminate surplus reserves by buy­
ing interest bearing assets. H is equal to (l-n)p where p is the 
average spillover of deposits from the expanding bank (the one trying 
to eliminate surplus reserves) to other banks and n is a linear combina­
tion of average spillover into currency and time deposits. Thus M- reduces 
- 1  
the average loss coefficient and the term (A. - K) is Brunner and 
Meltzer's money multiplier for responses to surplus reserves. Surplus 
reserves are given by the relation 
S = A dB + dL - A, dC + A_ dt + A„ dE - dV^ (1.2-5) 
o 1 o 2 o 3 o 
where B is the monetary base (the amount of money issued by the government); 
L is the total of changes in required reserves resulting from changes 
in the average reserve requirement and from the redistribution of 
deposits between various classes of banks', E is a parameter measuring 
the structure of interbank deposits; dC^ represents changes in the public's 
demand for currency occurring independently of changes in the public's 
monetary wealth; dt^ represents changes in the public's demand for time 
deposits occurring independently of the public's wealth; and dV^ represents 
changes in the banks' demand for cash assets in excess of required 
6 
reserves occurring independently of changes in the level of banks' 
2 deposits. The are positive constants. Then the change in M 
(defined as currency plus demand deposits plus time deposits) is given 
by 
dM^ = m^s + q dB (1.2-6) 
2 
where m is the surplus reserve (or money) multiplier and q is the 
proportion of a change in the money base that affects bank reserves 
and deposits simultaneously. 
1 2 
The change in M (M - T) is 
dM^ = m^s + q dB - dt^ (1.2-7) 
where m^ is the money multiplier for the definition of M excluding 
time deposits. 
Replacing s in Equation 1.2-6 and Equation 1.2-7 with Equation 
1.2-5 and integrating yields the linear hypothesis' expressions for 
1 2 
M and M : 
= m^ + m^(B+L) - + m^A^t^ - m^^ (i) (1.2-8) 
= n^ + m^(B+L) - m^A^C^ - [ l-m^A^] t^ - m^V^(i) (1.2-9) 
where B+L is the "extended monetary base," m^ and n^ are positive 
constants, and the notation V^(i) is used to express the dependence of 
the money stock on interest rates through the impact of interest rates 
1 2 
on the banks' asset portfolio, m and m are the money multipliers. 
Behind the terms C^, t^ and lie the public's demands for currency 
and time deposits which depend upon the public's money wealth, nonmoney 
wealth, and all interest rates as well as the banks' demand for "avail­
able cash assets" which depends on the relevant interest rates and the 
level of deposit liabilities. 
7 
Again the money stock depends upon the decision of three sectors: 
the government in determining B+L, the public in determining and t^ 
and the banking system in determining V^(i). Implicit in this hypothesis 
is the assumption, as Fand has pointed out,^ that the marginal pro­
pensities to hold time and demand deposits (with respect to changes in 
M) are constant. 
Brunner and Meltzer's nonlinear hypothesis centers on the credit 
market. The money stock and interest rates emerge from the interaction 
of the public's supply of assets to the banks and the bank^ resulting 
portfolio readjustment. 
The bank's desired rate of portfolio readjustment, E , is given by 
E® = h (R-R^) (1.2-10) 
where R is actual reserves and R^ is desired reserves. 
R^ = R^ (D, T, i, p) (1.2-11) 
where i is a vector of all interest rates and p is the discount rate. 
Excess reserves, R®, are given by 
R® = R® (i, p, D+T). (1.2-12) 
R® is assumed to be ht-mogeneous of degree one in D+T so that we can 
write 
R® = e (i, p) (D+T) (1.2-13) 
°d 
the public's rate of supply of assets to the bank, E , is given by 
o, J 
E = f (i, W, E ) (1.2-14) 
where W is the public's wealth and E*^ the public's desired portfolio 
^Fand, David I., Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis (19). 
8 
of liabilities to the banks. The public's desired rate of change in 
currency holdings and time deposits are given by: 
(kD-C^) (1.2-15) 
° 2 
T = q (tD-T) (1.2-16) 
where k is the desired currency to demand deposit ratio, t is the 
desired time deposit to demand deposit ratio, and D is the level of 
demand deposits. 
The banks desired rate of change of indebtedness to the Fed is 
o 
A = a [b (D+T) - A] (1.2-17) 
where b is the desired indebtedness ratio. 
Based on the above, Brunner and Meltzer write: 
B = A + B* (1.2-18) 
B = R + C (1.2-19) 
R = (r + e) (D+T) (1.2-20) 
= kD (1.2-21) 
T = tD (1.2-22) 
A = b(D + T) (1.2-23) 
E = E (i, W) (1.2-24) 
A 
where B in the adjusted or "relatively exogenous" base and all other 
symbols have been previously defined. This system of seven equations 
is then reduced to two through substitution and with the help of the 
assumption that B^ and W are given exogenously. These equations are; 
= mf B* (1.2-25) 
(m^ - 1) B* = E (i, W) (1.2-26) 
2 
where m , the money multiplier, is given by 
- (r + e - b)aVt) + k • (l'Z-27) 
From Equation 1.2-26 one of the rates of interest, say i^ (using 
their notation) can be determined in terms of the rest of the interest 
a 1 
rates, P, W, B , r, and k. Then this solution for i can be substituted 
12 s into 1.2-25, giving M as a function of interest rates i (s f 1), p, 
B^, r, and W. In other words, the solution to their two equations yields 
2 1 
M and one rate of interest, i . Equations 1.2-25 through 1.2-26 are 
the expression of the nonlinear hypothesis. 
2 Of the many other works that might be mentioned briefly, we shall 
concentrate on the models of Ronald L. Teigen (51) and Frank de Leeuw (16) 
The Teigen model is based on the proposition that the total level 
of reserves in the Federal Reserve System, various rules (such as the 
reserve requirements), and regular behavioral relations (between currency 
levels and the total money stock, etc.) "determine a maximum attainable 
money stock at any given time, and that this quantity (M**) can be 
considered to be the sum of two parts; one part which is considered to 
be exogenous and is based on reserves supplied by the Federal Reserve 
S 3 
System (R ), and the other based on reserves created by member bank 
1 2 Since all the terms in m are functions of i and/or p. 
2 See, for example, L. Grambley and S. Chase (27), A. Meigs (40), 
F. Modigliani (44) and S. Goldfeld (25). These and several other 
studies cited in the bibliography will not be discussed because of 
their highly specialized nature. 
3 
This is M*. 
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1 2 borrowing (B), and therefore considered endogenous." Teigen's goal 
is to explain the ratio of the observed money stock (M) to the exogenous 
segment of the total money supply (M*). He asserts that this ratio is 
a function of the profitability of bank lending. The important con­
clusions of the Teigen model are derived from his definitions of the 
money stock and the public's demand for currency and demand deposits 
(which he assumes are a constant proportion of the actual money stock). 
- R") + (B . 1 0') (1-2-28) 
1-c-h ^ kg 
where k is the reciprocal of the weighted average reserve ratio, c is 
the fraction of M held as currency by the public, h is the fraction of 
M held by the public as demand deposits in nonmember banks, is excess 
reserves, and is U. S. government deposits in member bam-s. 
M* (R®) = (1.2-29) 
and 
5* - X(rc' (1.2-30) 
where r is a measure of the return on bank loans and r is a measure 
c 
of the cost of bank loans. 
ÔX 
> 0 indicating that as the return on loans increases the endogen-
ÔX 
ous portion of M increases relative to M*. — < 0 indicating that as 
c 
the cost of loans increases, M* becomes a larger proportion of M. 
^This is B*. 
2 
Teigen, op.cit., p. 478. 
11 
Thus, Teigen breaks the money stock down into endogenous and exogen­
ous portions and attempts to explain the relation between the actual 
money stock and the exogenous portion in terms of the returns and costs 
of bank loans. Changes in these factors presumably change the quantity 
of loans banks are willing to supply and thus result in portfolio re­
adjustment by the banking system, fueling changes in the actual stock of 
money. 
The de Leeuw model is part of the Brookings-SSRC model. His portion 
of the overall model deals with the financial sector. There are seven 
markets: (1) bank reserves, (2) currency, (3) demand deposits, (4) time 
deposits, (5) U. S. securities, (6) "savings and insurance," and (7) 
private securities. The sectors included are: (1) banks, (2) nonbank 
financial, (3) the Federal Reserve, (4) the Treasury, and (5) the public. 
This submodel (of the SSRC model) assumes that the value of real variables 
is known and does not consider the affects of changes in the various 
rates of interest, or the money stock on the real variables in the model. 
(Their effects are measured elsewhere in the Brookings model.) 
The model itself is composed of 19 simultaneous equations, four of 
which are identities (the reserve identity, etc.) and the rest of which 
express the desired changes in assets in terms of lagged asset holdings, 
rates of return, and various short-run constraints on asset holding. 
Solving this system simultaneously, de Leeuw derives the following expression 
for the money stock:^ 
^de Leeuw, op.cit.. p. 518. 
12 
s (12-31) 
" 1-14,0 + 0-84 ["««DDI [%D + «DD, I + 0-82 
[Rj)^] + [0.011 - 0.010 RMggg^ - 0.007] 
'•'^ D 
GF 
'S 
where SM is the money supply (private demand deposits (DD) and currency); 
®DD = *DT = !•' ° "if-- deposits; RES^g is 
\jb 
unborrowed reserves plus currency held by member banks; RRR^^ is a weighted 
average of required reserve ratios against demand deposits; RRR^^ is a 
weighted average of required reserve ratios against time deposits; DD_„ 
is government demand deposits; is the discount rate; and is 
the average market yield on three-month Treasury bills. Substituting 
the definitions for and into 1.2-31 and using the a^ to replace 
the constants, we have 
RES 
'M - — 
1 - i + ^ f) + 
M M 
[^3 ^ RB " ^ 4 '^GSB- " ^ 5]^ sZ ^ j M 
Which clearly shows the dependence of the right-hand side of 1.2-31 
on supposedly given by equation 1.2-31. Solving 1.2-32 for S^ yields 
S^ = RES^g^ + DD - 0.84 [RRR^^][DD + DD^^] - 0.82 RRR^^ DT - (1.2-33) 
[0.011 - 0.010 RMpgg - 0.007][DD + DT] 
13 
Equation 1.2-33, derived from de Leeuw's expression for the money stock, 
says that the money supply, is smaller in size than unborrowed 
reserves plus currency held by the banks plus private demand deposits. 
This is a nonsense result and throws suspicion on the entire de Leeuw 
model. 
For the month of April, 1969, the appropriate figures (taken from 
the July, 1969, Federal Reserve Bulletin) are (in billions of dollars); 
Total reserves 27.079 
Borrowings .996 
Unborrowed reserves 26.083 
Total demand deposits 152.8 
Government demand deposits 5.1 
Private demand deposits 147.7 
Discount rate 5.5 percent 
Yield on three month bills 6.11 percent 
Time deposits 201.6 
Plugging these figures into Equation 1.2-33 and performing the arithmetic, 
we find that de Leeuw's equation gives a money supply of 150.64 billion 
dollars. The actual money supply for April, 1969, was 196.7 billion 
dollars. The difference between de Leeuw's prediction and the actual 
money stock is primarily the 43.9 billion dollars of currency in 
circulation in April. As can be seen from Equation 1.2-33, this 
component of the money supply has been lost in de Leeuw's formulation. 
Of the models reviewed here, the de Leeuw model is most similar 
to the approach we have taken. The other models tend to be deficient 
in two respects. First, they are too aggregative in the sense that 
the economy is broken down into only three sectors--the government, 
banks, and the public. No distinctions between households, manufacturing 
firms, and nonbank financial firms are drawn. Second, they all hide 
the general equilibrium nature of the monetary mechanism. In the finest 
14 
two models reviewed, the behavior functions of the various sectors are 
not explicitly specified. The Teigen model while specifying the public's 
demands for demand deposits and time deposits does so in terms of the 
total money stock, takes the total stock of money as the independent 
variable in these functions. While such a formulation will probably 
yield significant empirical results, from a theoretical point of view 
it seems awkward to visualize the public changing their holdings of 
demand and time deposits in response to a change in M rather than because 
of changes in income, prices, and interest rates. Hiding the general 
equilibrium nature of the problem also precludes description of the 
effects of changes in the money stock on the real variables of the 
economy. (This can be done in the SSRC model, but not by the de Leeuw 
sub-model itself.) 
The purpose of this work is, however, not to repudiate any of the 
existing work in this area, but rather to extend and amplify the 
analysis begun by these more narrow and specialized studies. 
15 
CHAPTER II. THE MODEL 
Introduction 
The model is made up of five sectors; the public sector, the 
manufacturing sector (the firms), the banking sector (the banks), the 
nonbank financial sector (the intermediaries), and the government sector. 
The purpose of this chapter is to spell out the details of each sector 
and the relationships between the sectors. The solution to the model 
will be considered in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The behavioral relations for each sector are given in both implicit 
and explicit form. For simplicity it is assumed; (1) most of the 
explicit forms are linear and reflect either utility or profit maximizing 
behavior, and (2) the individual units in each sector are homogeneous 
so that in most cases, aggregate levels can be obtained by summing 
the representative functions. 
The Appendix lists the symbols used in the model and their meaning. 
Production, Investment and Growth 
Technology is assumed to be characterized by increasing opportunity 
costs and is constant over time. For simplicity the following assumptions 
are made; 
1. There are only two inputs—capital and labor. A unit of 
labor is indistinguishable from any other unit of labor. 
Capital is also perfectly homogeneous. 
16 
2. There are only two outputs--capital and the consumption good. 
The consumption good is perfectly homogeneous. 
3. Firms fall into two categories--those that produce only the 
capital good and those that produce only the consumer good. 
Each firm within each category is identical to every other 
firm in the group. There is a large enough number of firms 
in each category so that, coupled with freedom of entry and 
exit, each firm is a perfect competitor in the output market. 
4. Individuals in the economy have identical endowments of capital 
and labor. No organization controls the supply of either 
capital or labor. Thus, the capital good firms are also 
perfect competitors in the input market and the labor market 
is perfectly competitive. 
The aggregate production function for the capital good is given by 
is the amount of capital used in the production of capital, 
Production 
(2 .2 -1)  
where L, is the amount of labor used in the production of capital and 
A A A 
> 0 ,  > 0 ,  <  0  
ÔX, kk 
and > . 
ait axw, $ • 
17 
If there are n firms producing capital, the production function for the 
i^^ individual firm is 
4 \ Xkk 
Xki = = XkflT' ir')' (2-2-2) 
The aggregate production function for the consumer good firms is given by: 
< " =<kc> <2.2-3) 
where is the amount of labor used in the production of the consumption 
good and is the amount of capital used in the production of the 
consumption good, 
a 2%^  ôx^  32%^  a2x* 
inr"- > 0' axT- > 0' ---I < 0' ---=2 < 0' 
kc 
H ^ and Ç ^0. 
a%kc < 
If there are m firms producing the consumer good, the production 
til 
function for the j firm is 
L X 
Xcj = (2.2-4) 
The transformation curve is shown below. The transformation function 
is given by 
X^ = T(Xj^) (2.2-5) 
where 1. T(0) ~ 
18 
2 .  T(ûr^i) = 0 
fk < 0 
QK: 
Figure 1. The transformation curve 
a  g i s  t h e  m a x i m u m  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n  g o o d  i n  p e r i o d  i  w h i l e  
a represents the maximum production of capital for the same period. 
Defining the transformation function implicitly we have 
T'(Xj^, X^) = 0. (2 .2 -6 )  
Thus X = (Xj^, X^) is a full employment output vector if 
T'(Xj^, Xg) = 0 (2.2-7) 
X' = (X'j^j X'^) is less than full employment if 
T'(X'^, X'g) < 0. (2 .2 -8)  
If T' < 0 the unused productive potential of the economy is measured by 
the negative value of T. The economy is in full employment equilibrium 
^c if 2.2-6 is satisfied and if •— = For purposes of the model we 
19 
assume that the explicit form of 2.2-5 is 
^ ci ^ ki ki (2.2-9) 
and oi . = cv, . for all i. Thus the explicit transformation curve assumed 
ci ki 
is a quarter circle in the positive quadracit. Writing 2.2-9 in a form 
equivalent to 2.2-2 we have that X'^ = X'^^) is a full employment 
output vector if 
K'ki • %'ki ^  0. (2.2-10) 
The marginal rate of transformation is 
MET = - — = + -T 5—p- (2.2-11) 
When 2.2-10 is satisfied output is at full employment and where, in 
addition 2.2-11 is equal to the price ratio, output is also an equilibrium 
output. 
The explicit form of 2.2-7 is simply 
Growth and investment 
The labor force is assumed to grow at the same rate as the population. 
This rate is assumed to be a function of the rate of change of the real 
output of the consumption good over time. 
20 
dX 
^/1 - X - xCjT) (2.2-13) 
dX 
^dT where \ is the rate of growth of the labor force, is functional 
notation, and where 1 a: —^— > 0. 
The rate of growth of the capital stock, k, is not tied to the rate 
of growth of the labor force. Gross and net investment are determined 
by the interaction of the supply and demand for capital. In general, 
however, k is assumed to be a function of the price of capital, the 
price of the firms' output, the firms' profit expectations, the various 
rates of interest, the rate of depreciation, and the existing stock of 
capital. The demand for capital is composed of both a stock demand for 
capital, D^, and a flow demand, dK.^ The stock demand is given by 
\ r, 0) (2.2-14) 
where r is a vector of interest rates r = (r_, r , r , etc.) and 0 is 
I g t 
a profit expectation function; also 
ô^k RD 3D» 
^ < 0, ^ <0, and -^ > 0. 
The flow demand for capital, dK, is given by 
dK = nK (2.2-15) 
where n is the rate of depreciation, 0 < n < 1 and K is the existing 
capital stock. 
^See P. Davidson (13), 
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The supply of capital is also composed of a stock supply and a flow 
supply. The stock supply, is simply equal to the existing capital 
stock while the flow supply, s^, is assumed to be dependent on the price 
of capital. 
(2 .2 -16 )  
where dp. > 0 .  
Diagramaticallv wp have 
P.. 
Di^+ d 
K K 
Piy 
Figure z. Supply ana demana lor capiuai 
where + dK is the market (stock + flow) demand for capital and 
+ s^ is the market (stock + flow) supply of capital. is the 
equilibrium price of capital. At this price gross investment is equal 
to Kg - K and net investment equal to - K. 
Note that it is the rates of interest relevant for financing and 
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determining relevant discount rates that, along with profit expectations, 
determine the exact locations of D^. As rates fall shifts outward, 
ceteris paribus. 
Although it would be more elegant to consider gross and net invest­
ment for each group of firms separately, we shall assume that 2.2-14, 
2.2-15, and 2.2-16 are defined in such a manner that their solution as 
shown in Figure 2 represents the aggregate levels of gross and net 
investment for both groups of firms combined. 
The rate of growth of the capital stock, k, is, in terms of 
Figure 2, 
K + K_ - K 
k — (2.2-17) 
We must now consider the effects of changes in the capital stock and the 
labor force on the transformation curve, given that technology is constant. 
The question here is basically if L^., give what will 
and equal if L grows by percent and K grows by k^ percent, 
A.J, ^ k^, e.g. what relation will the transformation curve in t + 1 bear 
to the curve in t? Will relation 2.2-9 hold over time? If not, what 
other assumptions about the nature of production must we make to insure 
that it does? 
Writing the total differentials of the production functions we have 
ax ÔX 
c c 
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... , "h 
'k 
From the definitions of k and X, 
dXk ° âK; dX*. + «Lk (2.2-19) 
k- I'-^/K (2.2-20) 
^ = i = t / L .  ( 2 . 2 - 2 1 )  
we have 
II = kK (2.2-22) 
and = XL (2.2-23) 
from which it follows that 
dK = kKdt (2.2-24) 
and dL = ^Ldt. (2.2-25) 
Substituting 2.2-24 and 2.2-25 into 2.2-18 and 2.2-19 we have 
ÔX ÔX 
dX^ = ^  kKdt + ^  ÀLdt (2.2-26) 
and dX^ = ^  kKdt + ^  ÀLdt (2.2-27) 
from which it follows that 
dX ÔX 9X 
^ =âx^ kK U (2.2-28) 
and kK+-i XL. (2.2-29) 
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2.2-28 and 2.2-29 tell us how the maximum possible outputs of the consumer 
good and the capital good change over time if the entire increase in the 
stocks of labor and capital are used in one good or the other. In order 
for the transformation curve to shift in a parallel way as a result of 
the growth of capital and labor it is necessary and sufficient that 
2.2-28 equal 2.2-29. Since we are starting from a position where 
o^ only the rates of change need be equal to insure the increase in 
is equal to the increase in Thus we have 
9X 3X Sx 
3%- kK + 3L^ = SK" (2.2-30) 
c c Tc k 
2.2-30 can be rewritten in two ways, both of which express the condition 
necessary for a parallel shift of the transformation curve. 
ax ôx^ ax ax. 
Regardless of the relative sizes of k and X and of their signs, if the 
marginal product of capital in production of the consumer good is equal 
to its marginal product in producing capital and if the same is true of 
the marginal products of labor in its two uses, 1 will be satisfied. 
If these marginal products are not equal 2 expresses the condition that 
must be satisfied for parallel shifts. 2 is also derived directly from 
2.2-30. 
• kK ôîT 
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Since 2 places no unrealistic constraints on the production processes, 
we assume that it is satisfied for all X and k between + 1. 
The labor market 
The aggregate supply of labor is a function of the wage rate, 
and the size of the population. If it is assumed that the labor force 
is a constant percentage of the population, we may write 
= sVjg, L) (2.2-31) 
where ^ > o and Jf- > 0. 
or 
At any point in time the supply of labor may be taken to be a function 
of only the price of labor. 
The aggregate demand for labor is composed of the demand of the 
capital good firms and the consumer good firms as well as the demands 
of the banks, government, and intermediaries. No attempt will be made 
to specify explicitly the demand functions for these sectors. (This 
is in keeping with our practice of not specifying these sectors demand 
for the capital good explicitly.) We include this demand by adding a 
constant, E, to the sum of 2.2-32 and 2.2-33. These demands are 
= KPjkfc <2.2-33) 
since all firms are perfect competitors. 
The aggregate demand is simply 
l/' =MP.,P, + MP PX +E. (2.2-34) 
J0k k c c 
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Under our assumptions on production, the aggregate demand curve will 
be downward sloping. Since labor is homogeneous^ it must be paid the 
same wage in each use. Thus we have 
L L 
Figure 3. Supply and demand for labor 
Pjj is the equilibrium price of labor. The amounts employed by each 
group of firms can be read from the diagram. L is the total amount 
employed, the amount used by the consumer good firms, and L - the 
amount employed by the capital good firms. No restrictions are placed 
on dp^/dt, e.g., no assumption of wage inflexibility is made. Thus, 
in one sense, labor will be fully employed so long as the existing 
is an equilibrium price. If P^ > P^ involuntary unemployment exists. 
If < P^ labor is fully employed, even though there is a positive 
excess demand for labor. 
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Production equilibrium and full employment 
The following conditions must be satisfied for the productive sector 
of the economy to be in equilibrium. 
1. is equal in both uses. 
2. P^ is equal in both uses. 
\ = ®k/c-
Condition 4 clearly implies that the marginal product of capital in the 
production of capital must be one in equilibrium. This is not startling 
since the capital good firms would obviously increase their own use of 
capital if > 1 and reduce it if MP^^ < 1. 
5. The marginal rate of technical substitution of labor for 
capital equals the input price ratio for both groups of 
firms. 
k ™kk 
c ^k 
»• = îFj; = V 
6.  ^  • 
When conditions 1 through 6 are satisfied the productive sector is in 
equilibrium in the sense that, given the total amounts of the inputs 
being used, it is impossible to increase output of earlier commodity by 
redistributing the capital and labor being used between the two groups 
of firms without reducing the output of the other commodity. However, 
1-6 are not sufficient to insure that the equilibrium output vector 
is also a full employment output vector. This is simply because nothing 
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in these conditions implies that the total stocks of capital and labor 
are being used. That is, 1 through 6 may be satisfied under conditions 
of unemployed labor and/or capital. In this case, even though redistri­
bution of the inputs actually being used cannot increase the output of 
one commodity without reducing the output of the other, it is entirely 
possible that increasing the total use of capital and/or labor can lead 
to an increase in the production of both goods. Thus, another condition 
must be added to insure that the equilibrium is also a full employment 
equilibrium. This condition is simply that the outputs of capital and 
the consumer goods that satisfy 1 through 6 also satisfy 
where and are the outputs resulting from satisfying 1 through 6. 
Note that the aggregate level of consumption demand which we have not 
yet considered has an impact on these conditions through its influence 
on and and, of course, may prevent 7 from being satisfied. 
The Manufacturing Sector (The Firms) 
The firms are divided into two groups--one group produces only the 
capital good while the other firm produces only the consumer good. 
Each group is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The only interfirm 
purchases are purchases of capital goods. Each group will be treated 
in the aggregate rather than on an individual firm basis. 
Production and sales for each firm in a group are identical (see 
the section on production in this chapter). Each firm has a desired 
level of retained earnings such that the aggregate desired level is 
given by 
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< = + s [Pec • (2.3-1) 
G'K^ represents depreciation, is, of course, aggregate 
sales in t and s is a constant, 0< s < 1. This term is included to 
reflect the demand for retained earnings arising from the desired of 
the firm to insure itself from the unexpected. Such risks are simplis-
tically assumed to grow in proportion to total sales. ^ is a factor 
reflecting the influence of past net investment on the level of retained 
earnings, a portion of which it is assumed are kept to meet the demand 
for financing net investment in future periods. For simplicity only 
one previous net investment figure is used in 2.3-1, although greater 
realism could be obtained by perhaps using average of several past 
periods. It is assumed that 3 is greater than zero and less than one. 
Equation 2.3-1 also gives the desired level of financial assets—cash, 
demand deposits, time deposits, government securities, and deposits 
in intermediaries—in the aggregate for period t since it is in these 
forms that retained earnings are held. At the end of each period the 
actual and desired stock of retained earnings are equalized by adjustment 
of the profit payments to the owners of the firms. Only when profit 
payments are zero would it be possible for the actual stock of retained 
earnings to be less than the desired level. In no case will the actual 
stock exceed the desired. 
Before discussing the desired distribution of u e stock of retained 
earnings another factor influencing the actual stock must be discussed. 
This is the relationship between desired financing and actual financing. 
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The replacement demand for capital, is assumed to be paid for 
completely out of retained earnings. Only a portion of net investment, 
equal to is paid for from retained earnings. The remainder, 
I . - 3l . creates the so-called demand for financing. This demand 
nt nt-i 
is the basis for the firms' demand for bank loans and loans from 
intermediaries and for its desire to issue more debt (the supply of 
firms nonownership securities). We have 
< = -9 \t-l (2-3-2) 
where is the desired level of financing in period t. 
Lft = fgXr, F^) (2.2-3) 
explicitly, + A^r^ (2.2-3a) 
where is firms' total demand for loans in t, is a vector of 
— D 
constants, r is a vector of all interest rates, and F^ the total amount 
of financing desired. 
Ft = (2.2-4) 
explicitly F^ = b^ F^ + A^r^ (2.3-4a) 
S 
where F^ is the supply of firms' securities in t and all other symbols 
are as defined above. The firms' demand for loans, 1^^, is broken 
down into a demand for bank loans, 1^^, and a demand for loans from 
intermediaries, 
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(4- 4t' 
(2.3-6) 
In explicit form 
4t = *l('bc - 'ft) + >>1 4t (2-3-7) 
£^t = 2^(^ t - + •'2 4t (2.3-8) 
where = -a^, + bg = 1, a^ < 0, a^ > 0. These restrictions on the 
constants in 2.3-7 and 2.3-8 insure that the sum of 2.3-7 and 2.3-8 
equals 2.3-3. The coefficients of are assumed to be constant (and 
not necessarily equal) to allow for the possibility that the firms 
may want to borrow different amounts from the two lending sectors even 
f f 
though = r^. This mix of desired borrowing is assumed to be 
constant over time. If is the net increase in borrowing and the 
net increase in securities outstanding then, 
V - - (^£t + ^£t) ^  O- (2-3-5) 
and F^ are determined by the interaction of the demand for loans 
(the supply of securities) and the supply of loans to firms (the total 
demand for firms' securities). If 2.3-5 equals zero, then the financing 
demand is satisfied completely by increasing the firms debt. If, however, 
2.3-5 is positive the difference is made up by a temporary reduction in 
the stock of retained earnings below their desired level. (Note that 
the capital good firms do not themselves extend credit to their purchasers.) 
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This discrepancy between desired and actual retained earnings is made 
up by a reduction in profit payments as discussed before. 
Let 
:nt - "nt-l - (Ifc + =£t> - " (2-3-1°) 
where represents the unintended change in the firms' financial 
asset position caused by insufficient financing to meet investment 
demand. M(Aj^) represents a redistribution of income away from the 
owners of the consumer good firms to the owners of capital good firms. 
As we shall see, aggregate public income is not reduced. In summary, 
E °  =  =  E ® _  +  (2 . 3 - 1 1 )  
where is the actual stock of retained earnings (or, equivalently, 
the actual stock of financial assets, at the end of period t; 
is the actual stock of retained earnings at the beginning of period t, 
which is equal to the actual and desired stock of retained earnings at 
the end of period t-1; and is the desired change in the stock of 
retained earnings during t. 
can be expressed as follows: 
^ct ^kt \t - ^ ct-1 - (2.3-12) 
Furthermore, can be written as a function of 
''ct +''kt • W- (2-3-13) 
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The function f^ is really a reduced form of the production function. 
The level of output is determinate given the amount of capital used under 
the assumption that, given the input price ratio, the least-cost combina­
tion of labor and capital is used. Thus, 2.3-8 becomes 
- Int.2) 
° ^111-2" (2-3-15) 
+ ^ "nt-1 " I„t-2> 
= «nt-1 + =l£3«t-l + V-l) - f »t-2 + (2.3-16) 
V-2>I +®"nt-l - Int-2> 
= alnt-l + :[f3(Kt-l " \-2 + \t-l " ^ -2'! 
+ eo.t-i - V-2) 
'I.t-1 + + ®"nt-l - V-l>- (2-3-18) 
Letting (or + g) + sf^ equal f^ we have 
K ' '4(1.C-l) - »"nt-2> (2 3-19) 
which expresses the dependency of desired changes in retained earnings 
on net investment. Summing over t in 2.3-19 (or integrating when time 
is assumed to be continuous) leads to the dependency of the stock of 
retained earnings on the capital stock as expressed in 2.3-1. Rewriting 
2.3-1 in an analogous manner leads to; 
34 
E® = cvKj. + sfgCK^ ) + P(K^  - K^ _^ ) (2.3-20) 
or = (cv + P) + sfgCK^ ) - P(Kt_i) 
or, letting (& + P) + sf^CK^) = f^CK^), 
E° = fjCK,) - e(K,_i). (2.3-21) 
The firms' decision-making process in regard to the size and distribution 
of retained earnings is visualized in the following manner. First a 
decision is made regarding the desired stock of retained earnings and the 
necessary adjustments of profit payments made to realize this goal. 
Second, after desired size has been achieved the firm decides on the 
desired distribution of retained earnings (financial assets) as described 
below. Letting DE^ represent the desired distribution of retained 
earnings in t, we have: 
the elements of which are cash balances, demand deposits, time deposits, 
government securities, and deposits in intermediaries. Firms are assumed 
to hold no debt instruments issued by other firms. Thus, 
DE° = = f^ (r, PX) (2.3-22) 
where is the desired distribution of financial assets, r is a vector 
of all interest rates, and PX = X^ + Pj^ X^. is itself a vector. 
Obviously 
i=l 
(2.3-23) 
(2.3-24) 
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Equation 2.3-17 can be broken down into an interdependent system of 
equations each giving the desired level of one asset. The desired level 
of cash balances, is assumed to depend only on the level of sales. 
Thus, 
C ft = + ''ktVl (2.3-25) 
where a^ is a constant, 0<a^<l. Changes in rates of interest are 
assumed not to affect desired currency balances although they are assumed 
to influence the desired level of demand deposits. Equation 2.3-25 is 
designed to reflect the assumption that holding currency balances is a 
nuisance to the firms and such balances are held to an absolute minimum. 
The desired level of demand deposits is assumed to be a function of the 
level of sales, the rate of interest on time deposits, and the rate of 
interest on government securities. Thus, 
°ft " "^f (PX) + Vf (2.3-26) 
The desired levels of time deposits, and government securities are 
also functions of the same variables. Thus, 
T°t = tf(PX) + A^r^; (2.3-27) 
= gf(PX) + Ag7^; (2.3-28) 
= ngCPX) + Agr^. (2.3-29) 
We now turn to an examination of the sources and uses of income for 
the firms in the consumer goods group. There are four sources of income 
for these firms: sales, interest on time deposits, interest on government 
36 
securities, and interest on deposits in intermediaries. Let be the 
receipts (income) of these firms in period t. Then 
R. = PX^ + r + r^ + r N. . (2.3-30) 
^ct ' '^ct "t 'ct 
The uses of income include the following; (1) payments to labor, (2) 
profit payments ("dividends"), (3) changes in financial asset holdings, 
(4) loan repayments, (5) debt (security) retirement, and (6) investment 
expenditure. One and two are treated strictly as residuals and are 
represented by (income received by the public from consumer goods 
c 
firms). Changes in financial asset holdings are equal to . Loan 
t p (l+r (i))L&i)n t Kl+r (i))Lj(i)-i 
repayments equal 2 |_ + Z (_ £ J 
i=t-n i=t-n 
t (1+r (i))F (i), 
abbreviated ZL^. Debt retirement equals 2 
i=t-n •- N J 
abbreviated 2F . Gross investment equals I . Let represent the 
sum of one through five. Then U = + aA^ + 2L^ + 2F (2.3-31) 
®ct ct ct c ^ 
However R_ < since part of net investment must be financed. Let 
ct ct 
Sjg be total spending power of the consumer goods firms in t. Then 
c 
S  = R  + L  + F  ( 2 . 3 - 3 2 )  
' ct ^ct ct 
and SJ = . (2,3-33) 
ct ct 
Inclusion of the capital goods firms allows the elimination of the c 
subscript in 2.3-29 to 2.3-32. It is assumed a typical capital good 
firm, even though satisfying its demand for capital goods from its own 
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output, has a financing demand identical to the consumer good firm and 
behaves otherwise in the manner described above. Thus, aggregation over 
all firms yields the detailed statement of 2.3-33: 
+ 'g/ft + 't/ft + + "-ft + = (2-3-34) 
+ ^ £t + ®£t + \t\ft + ïft 
+ \''lt + + (2-3-35) 
- ^(*£t) - ^£t - - \t\ft 
The Government Sector 
All levels of government are treated together—that is, as if there 
were only one government. No attempt is made to reflect the actual 
institutional constraints under which "government" operates. The func­
tions our government performs are; 
1. Reallocation—All physical production is assumed to take 
place in the manufacturing sector. The government buys 
capital and the consumption good from the firms. A portion 
of these goods is consumed by the government and a portion 
is distributed to the public free of charge. 
2. Economic Regulation—Fiscal policy is not consciously used 
to regulate the level of economic activity. Government 
spending is limited to the acquisition of the amount of 
goods necessary for the operation of the government and 
for making the (exogenously determined) transfer payments. 
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Tax receipts are assumed to be equal to these expenditures plus 
the interest payments on government securities. Conscious 
economic regulation is attempted through monetary policy 
exclusively. The standard monetary tools are available-open 
market operations, changes in the discount rate, and changes 
in reserve requirements. (Each of these will be considered 
in detail in Chapter IV.) 
Taxes and government spending 
All taxes are assumed to be paid by the individuals in the economy. 
No taxes are explicitly levied on the banks, firms, or intermediaries. 
All profits over and above the requirements for retained earnings to 
meet future investment are paid to the individual owners of these 
enterprises. This income is taxed at the same rate as income received 
from other sources (wage and interest payments). We have then 
T = tY (2.4-1) 
where T is total tax receipts, t the tax rate, and Y aggregate public 
income before taxes, t is assumed to be constant to reflect an earlier 
assumption of no conscious fiscal policy. Furthermore, government 
spending is given by: 
T  =  r G  +  P, X ,  + P X  (2. 4 - 2 )  
g k Teg c eg 
whëre r^ arid G represent the coupon rate and aggregate face value of 
government securities outstanding respectively (see the next section). 
The amounts of capital and the consumer good purchased are determined 
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residually. 
W g  = G ( T  -  v Z )  (2 . 4 - 3 )  
"c\g = (1 - 9)(T - r^G) (2.4-4) 
where 9 is a positive constant less than one. These relations insure 
that the budget is balanced. 
Government securities and monetary affairs 
The government issues only one type of security with one year 
maturity and fixed face value of $1. The coupon rate is fixed at r^. 
The actual rate in any period, r^, may, of course, differ from the coupon 
rate depending on whether or not the bond is sold at its face value. 
If Pg is the price of one security, then 
r = P r (2.4-5) 
g g S 
T 
or r = ^ (2.4-6) 
^ g 
At the end of each year the holder of a bond received $(1 + r^) payment 
of interest and principal. The government is not required to buy back 
unmatured bonds, although they may be freely traded among individuals 
and corporate entities. The amount^ and timing of government sales and 
purchases of government securities may be determined either by purely 
passive reaction to the net demand of the nongovernment sectors or 
may be determined by conscious monetary policy goals. This area 
will be examined in detail in Chapters III and IV. 
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In any event, the effect of net changes in the amount of government 
securities outstanding will be to change the stock of money in the hands 
of the private sectors. Suppose P G dollars in bonds were issued at 
gt t 
the beginning of period t. At the end of the period (1 + 1^)6^ dollars 
are paid out in interest and principal. In t + 1, ^ g^+i^t+l 
worth of bonds are issued and interest and principal payments are 
(1 + at the end of the period. The initial impact on the money 
stock in period t+1 is given by (1 + r )G. - P . If this is 
g t gt+1 t+1 
positive, the refunding increases the money stock by (1 + r )G -
g t 
^gt+l^t+1 the appropriate multiplier; if negative, the money stock 
is decreased. The effect of refunding in t+2 will be given by (1 + rg)G^^^ 
- ^ gt-^2^t+2 the appropriate multiplier, etc. The government's 
ability to control G, the number of bonds issued, and P (or r ) is the 
g g 
key element in open-market operations. The size of the multiplier and 
the strength of the relations between the stock of money and real 
variables determines the effectiveness of this sort of monetary policy, 
(see Chapter IV). 
When solving the model in the absence of discretionary monetary 
policy, we shall assume that the government's supply of bonds is 
infinitely elastic at the current rate of interest (price of bonds). In 
Chapter IV, this assumption will be removed. Thus, 
G® = G°® (2.4-7) 
where is the supply of bonds and G^^ the aggregate demand for new 
bonds. This implies that the price of bonds (actual rate of interest 
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on governments) is constant over time. 
The rediscount mechanism is assumed to operate in the following 
manner. All loans made by the banks are discounts and are assumed to 
be eligible paper. The rediscount rate, r^, is a percentage of the 
face value of the notes held by the bank. The bank receives (1 - r^)X 
when it rediscounts a note whose face value is X dollars. If the 
total value of the bank's loan portfolio in any period is Y dollars, 
the maximum amount of rediscounting is (1 - r^)Y. 
The government is assumed to rediscount as much paper as the banks 
offer at the current rediscount rate. The rate itself is set by the 
monetary authority (see Chapter IV). Thus, for any rediscount rate, 
d = d^(rj) (2.4-8) 
where d is the actual amount of rediscounting and d"^ the quantity of 
rediscounting demanded at rate rd. 
The effect of rediscounting is, as we shall see later, to increase 
the quantity of bank loans supplied. 
The government (monetary authority) also establishes, and is 
free to change, the reserve requirement, r. It is assumed that both 
time and demand deposits are subject to the same reserve requirements. 
Thus, the total amount of required reserves, R, is given by 
R = r(D + T) (2.4-9) 
where D is the aggregate level of demand deposits and T the aggregate 
level of time deposits. All banks in the economy are assumed to be 
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subject to the regulation of the monetary authority. Effects of change 
in the reserve requirement on the stock of money are discussed in Chapter 
IV. 
The government is strictly a passive supplier-absorber of currency. 
Thus, at any point in time, the stock of currency, C^, is identical to 
Da. 
the aggregate demand for currency, C^ . Thus, 
Cj. = (2.4-10) 
Until monetary policy is considered explicitly, the government is 
essentially passive in the model. 
The Banking Sector 
Banks perform two major functions: they accept time and demand 
deposits from the public, the firms, and the intermediaries and they 
make loans to the public and the firms. As adjuncts to these services 
they also hold currency and government securities as secondary reserves, 
engage in rediscounting, and hold primary reserves. 
Time and demand deposits 
Time deposits earn a yearly rate of interest, r^. This rate is 
paid on all time deposits regardless of their source (public, firm, 
or intermediary). The banks view all time deposits as homogeneous, 
regardless of their source. Even though some time deposits (or demand 
deposits) may be held as compensatory balances, no attempt is made to 
distinguish this portion of deposits from "ordinary" time or demand 
deposits. The banks' demand for time deposits is perfectly elastic 
at the current rate of interest on time deposits. Banks "buy" the 
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total amount of time deposits willing to be "sold" by the other sectors 
at the prevailing rate on time deposits. Thus, letting represent 
the banks' demand for time deposits, we have 
T® = + T® (2.5-1) 
p t n 
S S S 
where T^, T^, and represent the quantity of time deposits by 
the three sectors. is the total level of time deposits in period 
t; thus, 
^ + it + (2.5-2) 
The rate banks pay on time deposits is assumed to depend on the 
profitability of loans and the cost of obtaining reserves from alternate 
sources. The rates of loans to the public and to the firms 
minus the rate on time deposits are surrogates for profitability. The 
only other source of reserves under the control of the banks is the 
rediscount mechanism (see below). The rediscount rate (r^) measures the 
cost of reserves obtained in this manner. Thus, 
<2.5-3) 
Sinçlifying, 
't = '[('bp' 'bf 'd> (:-5-4) 
The explicit form of 2.5-4 is 
't ° 'tt-l + *ÔÛb - - O- (2.5-5) 
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where 1 > a >0. Increases in r, ^  or r, make loans more profitable 
br bp 
and thus induce the banks to attempt to attract more time deposits by 
raising r^ and vice-versa. Increases in the rediscount rate tend to 
reduce rediscounting and thus induce the bank to look elsewhere 
for reserves to make up for the drop in rediscounting. 
Demand deposits do not earn a monetary return. Service charges 
are ignored. The banks accept all demand deposits offered them. 
Thus, the banks' demand for demand deposits is perfectly elastic. 
Letting represent the banks' demand for demand deposits, we have 
D° = Dp + . (2.5-6) 
The total amount of demand deposits in t, D^,^ is given by 
(2.5-7) 
Demand and time deposits are the only liabilities of the bank 
that will be given explicit treatment. The only explicit recognition 
of capital account items is the assumption that all profits are paid 
out to the banks' owners. 
Banks are assumed not to hold demand deposits in other banks. 
This in effect eliminates the correspondent banking system from con­
sideration in the model. 
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Loans, reserves and rediscounting 
The legal reserve requirement, r, applies to both demand and time 
deposits. The total level of required reserves in period t, R^, is given 
by 
Rf = + T^). (2.5-8) 
Required reserves are all held in the form of noninterest bearing deposits 
at the monetary authority. For simplicity vault cash, or cash held by 
the banks, is not assumed to be part of required, or primary, reserves. 
Secondary reserves are held in three forms--cash, securities issued 
by firms, and government securities. Deaired cash balances, C^, are 
given by 
= y(D + T) (2.5-9) 
where 1 > Y >0. Interest rates are omitted from 2.5-9 reflecting the 
assumption that banks hold vault cash strictly to meet day-to-day with­
drawal requirements and that any cash over the minimum needed for these 
requirements will be used to buy government securities as long as r^ is 
greater than zero. This is equivalent to assuming that the banks do 
not have a speculative demand for mone% in this case, cash. 
The desired level of government securities, G^, is given by 
= p(D + T) + . (2.5-10) 
p is a positive constant less than one. Its magnitude is determined 
by the "institutional" requirements for secondary reserves such as 
seasonal fluctuations in deposits, etc. aj^Q is a positive constant 
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reflecting the assumptions that (1) as the yield on governments increases, 
secondary reserves become more governments become a more attractive form 
in which to hold secondary reserves—e.g. an increase in r^ causes a 
larger portion of secondary reserves to be held in governments, ceteris 
paribus, and (2) an increase in r^ also causes the total amount of 
desired secondary reserves to increase, ceteris paribus, b^^ is a 
negative constant reflecting the fact that secondary reserves will be 
switched from governments, to firms' securities as the yield on these 
securities rises, ceteris paribus. ®10 also negative 
constants reflecting the assumptions that (1) as r^ rises, profit 
margins are squeezed, inducing the banks to shift funds from low-yielding 
secondary reserves to higher yielding loans and (2) as the rates banks 
charge for loans increase (ry^ and r^^,) the increased profitability of 
loans also tends to reduce the level of desired secondary reserves. The 
converses of the above assumptions are also assumed to hold. 
The desired level of firms securities, F^, is given by 
= IJ.(D + T) + (2.5-11) 
^ is a positive constant less than one. a^^^ is a negative constant 
while b^^ is positive, d^^, and e^^ are also negative constants. 
The arguments here are the same as those given for the signs of the 
constant terms in 2.5-10 above. 
The total level of desired secondary reserves is given by the sum 
of 2.5-9, 2.5-10 and 2.5-11. At no time will the actual level of 
secondary reserves be less than the desired level. If, however, the 
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banks are unable to make the total amount of loans they wish, actual 
secondary reserves may be greater than the desired level. Letting 
Sa 
Rj_ be actual secondary reserves in t, 
4^ ' St + St + St + O-t - S) (2.5-12) 
g 
where is the total quantity of loans banks wish to make in t and 
the amount actually lent by the banks in t. The term in the parentheses 
in 2.5-12 will be referred to as surplus reserves. It is assumed that 
all surplus reserves are held in the form of cash so that the banks' 
actual cash holdings in t are given by 
<t = St + - S (2.5-13) 
S 
when is positive. 
Cbt = Cbt 
C 
when = 1^. Surplus reserves are assumed to be held in cash rather 
than securities to reflect their transitory nature. That is, banks feel 
that such a situation is only temporary and do not wish to switch in and 
out of securities on a short-run, impredictable basis.^ 
Bank loans to both the public and firms are made for a period of n 
years. Loans made in period t carry a rate of interest of r^^^ and r^^^ 
respectively. The proceeds to the bank of a loan of X dollars are 
(1 + ry)X 
(1 + ry)X, repaid in n installments of — dollars. Loans to 
In an attempt to keep the model as simple as possible, we have 
omitted the Federal Funds market, although it is recognized that this 
is the sort of situation that created this particular financial market. 
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both the public and the firms are assumed to be riskless. (Alternatively, 
one could think of r^^^ and r^^^ as representing the net return per dollar 
lent after default and added collection expenses.) 
The aggregate amount banks wish to loan from unborrowed reserves in 
t is given by 
= Tr(D^ + Tj.) + A^^r^. (2.5-15) 
TT is a positive constant less than one. a^2 b^^ are negative constants 
since increased yields on securities will, ceteris paribus, tend to 
reduce loans and increase secondary reserves, d^^ is a positive constant 
since increased costs create pressure for shifting from secondary 
reserves to loans, f^^ and e^^ are positive reflecting the fact that the 
increased profitability of loans as interest rates rise will result in 
increased willingness to lend. Surplus reserves, in period t-1, 
(C^^ ^ ^), clearly increase the banks willingness to lend. The 
amounts the banks wish to loan to the public and the firms, 1^^, and 
depend on L^, the difference between r, . and r,_^, and institu­ât t opt oxt 
tional factors: 
^pt " ^p^'t *13(^bpt " Sft^ (2.5-16) 
^ft ^  ^fLSt • *13(^bpt " ^ bft) (2.5-17) 
where 4p + 4^ = 1 and a^^ is a positive constant. Institutional factors 
such as the desire to meet the demands of existing customers, unwilling­
ness to loan more or less than some percentages of the total loan portfolio 
to any one type of borrower, etc., determine the relative sizes of and 
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Ji^ as well as the absolute size of a__. The smaller is a, „ the more r, 
t 1j 1j bp 
and r, _ must differ to induce a wide difference between and 
bf pt ft 
and represent the initial quantity of loans the banks are 
willing to supply the public and the firms from unborrowed reserves. 
These figures do not necessarily represent the actual amount of loans 
made. Let and represent the quantity of bank loans demanded by 
the public and the firms in period t. The actual amount of bank loans 
made to each sector in period t, and depend on the quantities 
demanded and the quantities supplied from unborrowed reserves as well 
as the banks willingness to engage in, and ability to obtain, rediscount-
ing. 
When ^ no rediscounting occurs. In this 
pt ft pt ft 
case the final amounts lent are given by: 
tpt = 
LfC = 13%. (2.5-19) 
Table 1 illustrates this situation. 
In this case, even though the entire public loan demand 
was satisfied by shifting a portion of the initial (and unlent) allocation 
for loans to firms to public loans. Firms were also able to borrow the 
amount they wished. 
When the final amounts lent depend on the pt ft pt ft r T 
amount of rediscounting. The banks' total demand for rediscounting is 
given by 
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Table 1. 
ï^t = SlOO IPI = $125 St - *125 
= $200 
+ ^ft = $300 
1% = $160 
ll\ + = $285 
= $160 
L^t + 4t - S285 
4 ' ^pt + I-ft - < + %) - d.(r - r, ) (2.5-20) 
bpt dt 
It is convenient to decompose 2.5-20 into the bank's demand for 
rediscounting to make additional loans to the public, d^, and to make 
additional loans to firms, d^. 
- ^pt - (2.5-21) 
<t = - ffpt - (2.5-22) 
where d^^ + d^^ = d^. (2.5-23) 
The terms -(L^^ - in 2.5-21 and -(1^^ - in 2.5-22 enter these 
equations only when they are negative. That is, only when the quantity 
of loans demanded by one sector is smaller than the quantity the banks 
are willing to lend to that sector. This situation allows the banks to 
" s h i f t "  m o r e  f u n d s  i n  a m o u n t s  e q u a l  t o  - ( L ^ ^  -  o r  - t o  
the other sector, thus reducing the banks' demand for rediscounting. 
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The parameters and d^ are positive and assumed to be greater than 
one. Their size determines how responsive the demand for discounting 
is to differences between the rate(s) of interest on loans and the 
rediscount rate. The closer r^ comes to r^^ (r^^) the greater is 
d^ d^ 
( ) and the smaller is the amount of discounting T — r T — T 
bpt dt bft dt 
the banks are willing to engage in. Note that the construction of 
2.5-21 and 22 imply that the amount of rediscounting will not be 
sufficient to meet the entire excess demand for loans. The addition 
of a constant term to these equations would make this possible for 
certain combinations of the loan rates and the rediscount rate. These 
terms have been omitted to reflect more strongly the banks' assumed 
reluctance to engage in rediscounting. 
As per our previous assumption, the actual amount of rediscounting 
is always equal to the amount of discounting demanded ; we have 
d, = 4 + (2.5-24) 
We shall use the terms d^^ and d^^ to stand for both the quantities 
of rediscounting demand as well as the amounts of rediscounting made 
because of the excess demand for loans from either the public (d^^) or 
the firms (d^^) in period t. Thus, in the case where < 
the actual amounts lent to each sector, and , are 
pt ft pt tt 
given by 
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:|t + ffp? - + 4J-
Note that the terms do not enter 2.5-25 and 26 if they are 
-1 -1 
negative. In the case being considered, only one of these terms may be 
positive, although both may be negative. In that event, the corresponding 
rediscount term will be zero. Table 2 illustrates the situation in 
which one of these terms is positive while the other is negative. 
Table 2. S < 0, > 0 
f f P P 
= 100 = 150 = -50 
= 100 L" 
p 
= 90 
1 
- L "  =  
p 
= 10 
= 200 < L» 
P 
= 240 
d d 
d = 90 - 100 - (100-150) ° 
^bp " ^ d 
d 
=  - 1 0  -  0  < 0  =  0  
^bp " ^ dt 
d d 
d, = 150 - 100 - (100-90) 
^ ^bf - ^d 
=  5 0 - 1 0  ( b y  a s s u m p t i o n  o n  d , ,  r ,  r , )  =  3 5  
r, ^  - r, ^ ^ ^ 1' of d' 
or a 
Lpj. = min {sO, lOo} + (100-150) + 0 = min {l50-100} + (100-90) + 35 
= min 90, 100 + 0 = 90 = L° = 100 + 10 + 35 = 145 
p ft 
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Equations 2.5-25 and 26 can also be used to express the final amounts 
lent when ^ since neither type of borrower can be 
f p p f 
induced to borrow more than the quantity of loans they initially demand 
(1?^ or . Equations 2.5-18 and 19 express this in much simpler 
form than the more general relationships 2.5-25 and 26. 
The rates of interest on bank loans in t are given by 
•^bpt - 'bpt-l + - :pLl) + (2-5-27) 
^p(^pt-l ^npt-1^ 
^bft ~ '^bft-l ^f^^ft-1 " ^ ft-l) (2.5-28) 
^"f^^bft-l ~ ^nft-l) 
where a and a^ are positive constants. These equations embody the 
following conceptualization. At the beginning of period t, banks 
adjust their rates either up or down depending on whether there was 
an excess demand ^ ^>0) or an excess supply of loans 
. <0) in the previous period. The amount of the adjustment 
-t-1 -L-1 
depends not only on the size of the previous excess supply or demand, 
but also on the sizes of a and a^.. Other rates of interest are not 
P f 
explicitly included in 2.5-27 and 28, as their impact on r^^ and r^^ 
is contained in the and terms. 
Concluding this section we have the simple statement that the 
banks' assets and liabilities must be equal. 
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t , t 
T. + = G, ^  + G, . + F, . + R. + 2 L. - 2 d.. (2.5-29) 
t t bt bt bt t 1 i=c_n ^ 
The banks? income statement in period t is more complex as it must take 
into account the effects of rediscounting on loan profitability and 
the possibility of capital gains or losses incurred on government and 
firms' securities. Let represent the total stream of profits from 
loans made in period 1 at maturity. Then, without rediscounting, under 
our assumption of no default 
%1 " + %1^ ^pl " ^ pl " Spl ^ pl' (2.5-30) 
The profit from loans made in period 1 in any one period, again without 
discounting is simply 
(2.5-31) 
n n n ^ 
« 
The total stream of profits at maturity from loans made in period 1, 
given that a portion of them are rediscounted in periods after period 
1 is given by 
= s (1 + \l>h + + [<^>» + Sl) ] <2.5-32) 
r, "Vi.i 1 , 
Lh - (i.-n)(l - rd_^ )^Cl + r^ j)-l ""l 
where ^  (1 + gives the repayment of interest and principal 
received by the bank prior to rediscounting a portion of ; d^^ ^  i 
the proceeds of rediscounting a portion of in period nri-1; 
IS 
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nd 
<^'<1 + [h - (n - m)(l + + r,,^] " h " repayment 
of interest and principal of the portion of not rediscounted in period 
nri-l; and is simply the face value of the loans made in period 1. 
Equation 2.5-32 reduces to 
"^1 " ^bl h "*• ^m4-l,l ' Frd^]" (2.5-33) 
The last term in 2.5-33 will be negative since 0 < 1 - rd^j^ < 1 and 
measures the loss of profit on loans caused by rediscounting a 
portion of them. 
Profit on loans for the period in which they are rediscounted 
is given by 
= [h - (...)(! fr'Sd - rd ,,)] (-4^) -
m+1 
which reduces to 
nd ^ -, 1 + r, 
Cbi)(l - ^ <^ni+l' 
f-r "'^m+l, 1 1 xl.\ . , 
L 1 (n-m)(l + r^^)(l - rd^^^)J ^n' m+1,1 
- I . rd J 
m+1 _ ^blh . , r, . 1 _ c oc\ 
^X1 n m+1,1 L (n-m) (1+r^j^) (1-rd^p " (2-5-35) 
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When no redlscounting occurs (d^^ ^  = 0), 2.5-35 is obviously equivalent 
to 2.5-30. Equation 2.5-35 serves as the basis for expressing the profit 
from all loans in any one period. Letting d^^ represent the unrepaid 
principal and interest of a period loan rediscounted in period i, 
we have 
m 
j=nri-l-n 
W-l r'bj 1 > i (Ij - . ^  dji) 
!="-•> +d_,, , (2.5-36) 
n m4-l,l 
(1 + (n-m)(H-r^j) (1-rd^^) (n-m)(l-rd^^) 
)] 1 
Profits on loans to the public, tt^^» is given by using r^^j, 
d and d ,. . in 2.5-36 while n ^  is obtained by using the 
PJi pnri-l,j f 
corresponding rate and rediscounting measures for loans to the firms. 
Thus, 
(2-5-37) 
Profit in period m+1 from government securities, -rr^^, is simply 
<wi-
No capital gains or losses are made on governments as a result of the 
assumptions of one year maturity and no intraperiod trading of the 
securities by the banks. 
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Profit in nri-1 from firms' securities, rr^^, includes both interest 
and possible capital gains (losses). Thus, 
, 1 m+1 r .B,_. m+1 
"£ = . J, , \ 
i=m+l-k i=m-k 
(^bfm+1 ^bfi) 
where k is the maturity of the firms' bonds and F, - PL does not bm+1 bf1 
enter the equation unless it is negative, e.g., unless the banks 
actually sell period i bonds in m+1 to actually realize accrued capital 
gains or losses. 
The banks? overall gross profit (before payments to owners, 
purchase of factors, and payment of interest on time deposits) in m+1, 
m+1 . . , 
TT , IS given by 
The only portion of that is not received directly by the 
public in the form of income in m+1 is the portion used to purchase 
capital, ' Thus, the banks' contribution to the public's 
income in m+1, is 
,m+l .^+1 _ (2.5_41) 
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The Nonbank Financial Sector (The Intermediaries) 
The nonbank financial sector is assinned to have two major functions. 
It accepts deposits from the public and the firms and lends to each of 
these sectors. The insurance function of this sector will not be 
explicitly recognized. Rather, deposits will be taken to include not 
only the typical savings deposit at, say, a savings and loan institution 
but also insurance premiums. Payments on insurance claims will be 
included in any withdrawals of principal plus interest from the "savings" 
accounts. For simplicity, it is further assumed that the rate of interest 
paid on these deposits is the same for both the public and the firms. 
The deposits in the nonbank financial sector are not assumed to be 
part of the stock of money. With the submersion of the insurance 
function the major impact of the nonbank financial sector will be 
on the banking sector with which it competes both for deposits and for 
loans. 
The following relations describe the aggregate activities of the 
nonbank financial sector. 
The actual level of deposits, N, is identically equal to the demand 
by the firms and the public for them, i.e., the supply of deposits is 
perfectly elastic. 
N = = ISp (2 .6 -1 )  
(2 .6-2)  
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This is simply the balance sheet equation for the nonbank financial 
sector. Note that 2.6-2 reflects the assumption that the nonbank sector 
has no direct connection with the banks except to hold demand deposits 
and time deposits. 
= V + (2-6-3) 
=» = Sn" + *15'. (2.6-4) 
»n " V + *16'% (2 6-5) 
(2.6-6) 
- •=/ (2.6-7) 
Equations 2.6-3 through 2.6-7 are the basic decision functions of the 
nonbank sector. Equation 2.6-3 gives the maximum aggregate amount of 
loans the sector is willing to make while 2.6-4 to 2.6-7 represent the 
demand for nonloan assets given that the nonbank sector is able to loan 
all it desires. Insufficient demand for loans will result in additional 
holdings of government securities, firms' securities, cash, and demand 
deposits as specified below. Ji^, g^, d^, b^, and c^ are positive 
constants while r is the rate of interest on loans to the public, 
np ^ ' 
r^j^ the rate on loans to the firms, and r^ the rate paid on deposits. 
All other symbols are as defined previously. 
S 
The aggregate amount willing to be lent, L^, is broken down between 
the firms and public in a manner analogous to that of the banks. 
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= r if + »18 (\pt - r.ft) <2.6-8) 
- 4 ' '18 (%t -
(2.6-10) 
Equations 2.6-8 and 9 are analogous to 2.5-16 and 2.5-17 for the banking 
sector. Xp and represent institutional factors influencing the desired 
distribution of loans between the public and firms, = 1. a _ 
p t io 
is a positive constant whose size determines the inçortance of interest 
rate differences in loan distribution. 
Adjustments in the initial breakdown occur if either the public's 
or the firms' demand for loans from the nonbank sector is less than the 
initial amount willing to be lent to that sector while the demand 
from the other sector is greater than the initial amount. Thus, if 
<L^ and than L , the actual amount lent to the public, 
np np nf nf np 
is equal to and L^_ = min - I? , ). Similarly, 
^ np nf nf np np n np 
4 ' - :'L)-
In either case the amounts actually lent in each sector are given by 
\p = (4 + 4" - f). I-np} (2.6-11) 
and . min + 0?" + L°»), L®j}. (2.6-12) 
The total amount lent, L^, is simply the sum of 2.6-11 and 12. In no 
g 
case can be larger than L^. It may however be smaller. In this 
case the holdings of interest earning assets are increased above the 
levels given by 2.4-4 through 2.6-7 as given below. 
6 1  
(2.6-13) 
(2.6-14) 
(2.6-15) 
If two of the rates (r , r , r,) are equal and the third smaller, the g c i 
g 
increase in demand for those assets will be equal to one half of -
L^. If all three rates are equal the increase in demand for each asset 
securities and time deposits are assumed to be perfectly elastic, no 
complications arise if either 2.6-13 or 15 hold. If 2.6-14 holds it is 
possible that, since the supply of firms' securities is not perfectly 
elastic, the nonbank sector may not be able to acquire all the firms' 
securities it desires. In this case, either government securities or 
time deposits will be increased in an amount equal to the unsatisfied 
demand for firms' securities depending on the relative sizes of r and r . 
g ^ 
To describe the determination of the various rates of interest 
associated with the nonbank sector we again introduce the subscript t 
to represent time. Note that this subscript has been omitted from 
the first 15 equations merely for convenience. We have 
g 
will equal one third of - L^. Since the supplies of government 
(2.6-16) 
where a^g > 0 and b^g < 0 
(2.6-17) 
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where a2Q > 0 and < 0. 
W = 'nt + -21 < - '^ np -
where b^^ < 0. 
For the nonbank sector to be in equilibrium the following conditions 
must be satisfied. 
Wi ='nt+i-l (2-G-19) 
'n£t+i - 'n£t+i-l (2-^-2°) 
%t+i = 'npt+i-1 (2-6-21) 
4t - ^ nt <2.6-22) 
Fj. = (2.6-23) 
Note that desired holdings of time and demand deposits, government 
securities, and cash will be satisfied under all conditions. 
The intermediaries "balance sheet" was given in Equation 2.6-2. 
Their "income statement" provides Y^, the contribution of the intermediaries 
to the income of the public in period t. For implicity, it is assumed that 
all loans made by the intermediaries have a maturity of n years. Since 
we do not provide for any governmental sources of reserves for the 
intermediaries (no rediscounting of their loans), the profit on loans 
in period t, tt^» is sinçly 
t-1 r , L®. t-1 r L^. 
TTL = 2 ( ^ ) + 2 (-2—^). (2.6-24) 
i=t-n-l i=t-n-l 
63 
Profit on government securities in t, is given by 
• 'gt=nf 
While the profit on firms' securities is 
iDrt-1 r^. B nri-1 
(^nfm+1 " ®nfi^ 
which is equivalent to 2.5-39. The intermediaries gross profit in t, 
TT^, is 
t t , t t 
n^ - "j0n + ^gn + i^fn* Tr„ -TTor. + TT^ + TTf^' (2.6-27) 
The only portion of Tr^ not received directly by the public is the form 
of interest payments, labor payments, or dividends is the portion used 
to purchase the capital good, . Thus, 
- ^ kt\nf (2.6-28) 
The Public Sector 
The public sector is coiiq>osed of all individuals in the economy 
acting in their roles as consumers and suppliers of factors. Only the 
aggregate behavior of this sector is considered; no attempt is made to 
distinguish between different individuals or groups of individuals. 
The basic relationships for the public sector are given below. 
®pt ~ Vt ^22 ^ p (2.7-1) 
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(2.7-2) 
(2.7-3) 
(2.7-4) 
(2.7-5) 
(2.7-6) 
(2.7-7) 
(2.7-8) 
(2.7-9) 
Equations 2.7-1 through 2.7-9 express the public's demand for demand 
deposits, currency, time deposits, the consumption good, government 
only the price of the consumption good but, since there is by assumption 
only one composite, consumer good, also serves as the consumers price 
index. 
Equations 2.7-1 through 2.7-3 require no further comment. Equation 
2.7-4 expresses the dollar value of the public's purchases of the 
consumer good, e.g., C ^ = P It does not include the value of 
° nt ct cpt 
the consumer good transferred to the public sector by the government. 
Totgl consumption by the public sector of in period t is given by 
C + P X (see the section entitled the government sector). 
securities, loans, and firms' securities in dollar terms. P^ is not 
nt ct cgt 
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Equations 2.7-6 and 2.7-7 express the public's demand for loans; 
their sum is the aggregate demand. It is assumed, for simplicity, that 
unsatisfied demand for loans from one sector will not increase the 
quantity of loans the public demands from the other sector in the same 
time period. Unsatisfied loan demand in t causes the quantity of loans 
demanded in the t+1 to increase by an amount equal to the excess demand. 
Equations 2.7-5 and 2.7-8 are self explanatory. 
Other relations for the public sector include: (1) the definition 
of the public's gross income, Y^, 
+ "ft + 'gtGpt + + (2.7-10) 
'nt^pt + 'ft^p-
(2) the definition of disposable income, 
Yj. = (1 - t) Y^ (2.7-11) 
(see the section entitled the government sector). 
The Markets 
In this section we attempt to tie together some of the loose ends 
in the previous sections by examining the various markets in the model 
in some greater detail and in isolation. 
Currency market 
The price of currency is the opportunity cost of holding it, the 
income sacrificed by not holding a return earning asset. For simplicity 
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it is assumed that this cost can be represented by the largest of r^, r , 
^ S 
r^, and r^. Thus, the price of currency for the public is equal to 
1 + max \r^, r , r , r^f while for the firms it is 1 + max ir , r , r^r L f g' n' tJ I g' n' tJ 
since firms do not, by assumption, hold debt instruments of other firms, 
for the intermediaries is 1 + max ^ r^, r^, r^j , while for the banks, 
is 1 + max ^ r^, r^j" since banks hold neither time deposits nor deposits 
in intermediaries. If P^ is the price of currency, we have the typical 
downward sloping demand curve. Equations 2.3-30, 2.5-9, 2.6-7 and 2.7-4 
give the demand for currency explicitly. All variables in these equations 
except max ^r^, r^, r^, r^j" must be considered fixed when drawing Figure 4. 
Increases in rates other than the maximum rate shift the demand curves 
downward, since narrowing the difference between interest rates makes 
the security with the higher rate relatively less attractive. Increases 
in Y, D + T, or P^X^ + P^X^ shift the curve outward. Note that the demand 
^Perhaps a more theoretically aesthetic way of viewing P^ is as 
follows. The price of currency is the opportunity cost of holding 
currency rather than a return earning asset, e.g., time deposits, govern­
ment securities, and firm securities. Let 0^ be this cost. Then 
0 =0 (tr, r , r , r^) deposit in intermediaries, where the function 
c • c^ f g' n' t' ' 
on the right hand described the return that could be earned on an extra 
dollar distributed in the same percentage as the present distribution 
between time deposits, government securities, and firm's securities. For 
each sector we have; 
T G Br r N 
1 0 = r E J. _2 r ÉE 2_E 
cp t T +G +Br +N g T +G +N f T -Kî +B. +N T -Hî +B. +N p p f p p  " p  p f p p  p p f p p p p f p p  
T, G, B_ 
2. 0 . = r_ „ .„ — + r „ —— H r 
cb t T +G +B. g T -tG +B^ f T +G +B. 
p p fp p p fp p p fp 
(footnote continued on next page). 
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curve gives the demand for changes in currency holdings. At prices lower 
than P the public (bank, firm or intermediary) wants to increase its 
CO 
currency holdings while at prices above they want to reduce them. 
The stock demand for currency can be readily found by combining last 
period's stock, with the desired change in this period. Note that 
C establishes the lower limit for changes in currency holdings during 
t-1 
period t since the stock of currency cannot be negative. 
Figure 4. Demand for currency 
P(dC)  
8 (dC)  
(footnote continued from previous page) 
0 
cf t 
+ r 
r G 
_S_S_ 
cn Tn+Gn+Bfn 
Vfn 
Tn+Gn+Bfn 
For simplicity we have chosen not to use this definition of 0^. 
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The supply of currency in this model is not independent of the demand 
for it since by assumption we have the government passively issuing or 
absorbing currency in the aggregate amount demanded by the public, firms, 
and banks. Thus, we have 
D(dC) 3 s(dC) (2.8-1) 
for all P^. The aggregate demand for currency is obtained by summing 
the four sectors' demands for currency. Equation 2.8-1 holds both 
for each sector and for the aggregate. Thus, the currency market is 
in perpetual equilibrium. 
The market for demand deposits 
The price of demand deposits, P^, is defined in the same way as 
the price of currency, i.e., P^ = 1 + max ^ r^., r^, r^, r^j- for the public, 
equal to 1 + max ^ r^, r^, r^J- for the firms, and equal to 1 + max ^ r^, r^, 
r^j- for the intermediaries. The demand for demand deposits can be viewed 
in the same way as the demands for currency with the obvious exception 
that in this case there is, again by assumption, no bank demand for 
demand deposits. Figure 5 is analogous to Figure 4. 
The banks are willing to accept any amount of; new demand deposits 
and cannot prevent their withdrawal. Thus, again the supply of demand 
deposits is not independent of their demand and we have 
D(dD) - S(dD) (2.8-2) 
for all Pg. The aggregate demand is the sum of the public's, firms' 
and intermediaries' demand and 2.8-2 holds for the aggregate market so 
that the market for demand deposits is also in perpetual equilibrium. 
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D{dD)  
8 (dO)  
Figure 5. Demand for demand deposits 
The market for time deposits 
The price of time deposits, P^, is also an opportunity cost. Since 
time deposits earn a rate of return, the price of one dollar in time 
deposits, is given by 
- 1 + max {rj, r } - (2.8-3) 
for the public by 
P^ = 1 + r - r 
t g t (2.8-4) 
for the firms, and by 
Pj. = 1 + max {'(• 'J - (2.8-5) 
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J 
I 
I 
I D(dT)  
T  8 (dT)  
Figure 6. Demand for time deposits 
for the intermediaries. The demand for time deposits is also analogous 
to the demand for currency and is shown in Figure 6. Summing over the 
public's, firms' and intermediaries' demands again yields the aggregate 
demand for time deposits. The banks again are assumed to be willing to 
supply an amount of time deposits and cannot prevent their withdrawal 
long enough to affect the analysis. Once again then 
The market for government securities 
This market is in all respects similar to the ones already.described. 
We have 
D(dT) = S(dT) ( 2 . 8 - 6 )  
for and the aggregate market for time deposits is always in equilibrium. 
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P = 1 + max jr., r.} - r for the public; 
g L t cj g 
P  = l + r - - r  f o r  t h e  b a n k s ;  
g f g 
P = 1 + max 
8 
p = 1 + max 
g 
ir , r r - r for the firms; 
L n' tJ g 
r^j" - r for the intermediaries. 
Then the demands can be shown by the following figure. 
G f - l  
t  T 
(2.8-7) 
(2 .8 -8)  
(2.8-9) 
(2 .8-10)  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Pqi 
1 
1 
8(dG)  
Figure 7. Demand for government securities 
Aggregate demand is the sum of the four sectors' demands. The govern­
ment is a passive supplier-absorber of government securities so that in 
each market and in the aggregate 
D(dG) a S(dG) (2.8-11) 
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for all Pg. The market for government securities is always in equilibrium. 
The market for bank loans 
This is the first market to boast a supply function that is independent 
of demand. The price of bank loans, P^, is 1 + r^^ for the public and 
1 + r,j. for the firms. The demand for loans is again expressed in terms 
br 
of desired changes in indebtedness to the banks. Thus, we have in 
general the situation shown below. 
D(d/ )  
.D(dL)  P L I  J I  I  I  
L f - i  - /L  dL|  /L  
I  L T  '  
Figure 8. Demand for bank loans 
Here L is the total indebtedness to the bank (unpaid principal plus 
t-1 
interest on loans) at the beginning of period t and dL represents the 
change in indebtedness during t. Note that if P^ = P^^ the desired 
change in indebtedness is zero but that this does not mean that desired 
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new loans in t are also zero. When P. = P. desired loans in t are XJ XJO 
loans is given by D(d^) in Figure 8. A graph like Figure 8 exists 
for both firms and the public. At any point in time the aggregate 
quantity of loans the banks are willing to supply is given by the solution 
to Equation 2.5-15. The supply of loans to each sector is based on the 
aggregate figure. The discussion in the section on the banking sector 
can be shown graphically as follows. 
Figure 9. Disequilibrium in bank-loan market 
Here O . and Q represent the initial amounts desired to be 
^spi sfi 
loaned to the public and the firms as given by Equations 2.5-16 and 17. 
amount of loan repayments in t. 
U 
Thus, desired new loans are zero when P^ and P^^ and the demand for 
\  D ( C|/)F 
i ^ ( d / ) p  
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In the situation drawn above excess supply exists in both loan markets 
period both rates will be reduced. An equilibrium situation is shown 
below. Not only do rates fall, but also the aggregate amount of desired 
loans by the banks also is reduced. 
Figure 10. Equilibrium in bank-loan market 
Figure 11 is a graphical presentation of the adjustment occurring 
when there is excess demand in one market and an excess supply in the 
other. Here represents the final quantity of loans made to the 
firms and the two black arrows, ES^, the final total excess supply of 
loans. 
Equilibrium in the loan market clearly requires QS^ = QD^QS^ = QD^, 
and QD + QD = QS . Equilibrium is achieved through adjustments of 
p S â 
iQDpsQSp 
75 
the rates of interest with its impact both on quantity demanded and 
quantity supplied. 
QSpi 
QSpF 
o
 
</>
 
"
0 QSA 
>r 
4 M! • — •¥ 
l + r b F  
'QDp-
QDpi ODpi 
Figure 11. Excess demand and excess supply in bank-loan market 
The market for intermediary loans 
The analysis of the market for intermediary loans is identical to 
that given above for bank loans and will not be repeated here. 
The market for the capital good 
See the section on production, investment and growth and in particular 
Figure 2 for a discussion of the market for the capital good. 
The market for firms' securities 
Debt instruments issued by the firms are held by both the public, 
intermediaries and the banks. The price is again defined in an opportunity 
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cost sense. Thus, P^, the price of firms' securities, is taken to be: 
P^ = 1 + max (r^, r^, r^) - r^ for the public; (2.8-12) 
P^ = 1 + r^ - r^ for the bank, (2.8-13) 
and P^ = 1 + max (r^, r^) - r^ for the intermediaries. (2.8-14) 
The demands can be shown by Figure 12; 
D(dF)  
Figure 12. Demand for firms' securities 
Figure 12 is completely analogous to Figure 7, (the demand for changes 
in holdings of government securities). In each period, the supply of 
securities by the firms is given by the solution of Equation 2.3-4a. 
The desired change in securities outstanding can be represented.by a 
vertical line. Thus, combing these flow demands and supplies we have 
in the aggregate Figure 13. 
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S(dF)  
D(dF)A 
Figure 13. Aggregate demand for firms' securities 
A note on aggregate demands 
Prices in the financial markets described above have all been 
framed in terms of opportunity costs. This results in different 
prices for the same item in different sectors. For example, the price 
of government securities for the public is assumed to be 1 + max 
ir^, r^f - r for the public, but 1 + max (1% , r ) - r for the firms. 
L f ' t J  g  t n  g  
If r^ > r^, different prices result. When aggregating sector demands, 
the price is assumed to be where r represents the rate on the item 
function and does not contradict the sector prices since there is a 
one to one relationship between, for example ^ ^  ^ and 1 + max 
g 
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Relations of the Model 
We simply reproduce the key relationships for each sector here for 
1 
convenience. 
Production, investment and growth 
1. Aggregate production functions: 
< - <2.2-3) 
2. Transformation functions: 
X^=T(X^); (2.2-5) 
Xci + = Q- ki" (2.2-9) 
3. Full employment: 
X| = (X^£> X^j^) is a full employment output vector iff 
Ki -/" L - Ki ^ "• <2.2-10) 
4. Rate of growth of the labor force: 
dX 
X = X(^). (2.2-13) 
5. Stock demand for capital: 
= Dk(Pk, r, 0). (2.2-14) 
^See bibliography items 3, 20, 22, 25, 29, 37, 42, 43, 47, 53, 55 and 
57 for a more complete discussion of some of the demand and supply 
functions presented here. 
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6. Flow demand for capital: 
dK = nK. (2.2-15) 
7. Stock supply of capital: 
Skt = 
8. Flow supply of capital: 
= k ° W -  ( 2 . 2 - 1 6 )  
9. Balanced growth: 
Sx 
_ k K + —  X L - —  k K  +  g ^ X L .  ( 2 . 2 - 3 0 )  
10. Supply of labor: 
S^ = S^(P^, L) (2.2-31) 
11. Demand for labor: 
D"^ = + MP. PX +E. (2.2-34) j&k k Xc c 
The firms 
1. Desired level of retained earnings: 
- Kt + S[ (2-3-1) 
= fgCK^) - P(Kj._j^). (2.3-16) 
2. Desired level of financing: 
- ^nt-r 
3. Demand for loans: 
=  n < ' b t  -  4 )  +  \  
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Lft - *2<'bt - rft) + Ift: (2-3-8) 
^ft (2.3-3a) 
4. Supply of securities: 
+ A^r^. (2.3-4a) 
5. Desired change in retained earnings: 
(2-3-19) 
6. Desired distribution of retained earnings: 
<t = (Cft- 4' it' 4t' 4t>- (2-3-23) 
7. Desired level of cash (currency) balances: 
= s + "kAJ • (2-3-25) 
— PX • 
8. Desired level of demand deposits: 
®ft " dfCPX) + A^F^. (2.3-26) 
9. Desired level of time deposits: 
T^t = Cf(PX) + A^7^. (2.3-27) 
10. Desired level of government securities: 
G°t = gf(PX) + AgT^. I (2.3-28) 
11. Desired level of deposits in intermediaries: 
= n^(PX) + AgF^. (2.3-29) 
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12. Contribution of firms to public's income: 
^ft = ^ ^t + ^ft + Vft + ^ ft + 
Bft - - 2Ljt ' ^ft " ^ kt\ft* 
(2.3-35) 
The government 
1. Tax receipts: 
T = ty. 
2. Government spending: 
T = fgC + Pk^kg + Pcfcg-
(2.4-1) 
(2.4-2) 
3. Supply and demand for government securities: 
G=. 
4. Rediscounting: 
(2.4-7) 
d = d (rd). 
5. Stock of currency: 
c, . c:' . 
6. Rate on government securities: 
" Zgt-1 • - Gf-z)' 
(2.4-8) 
(2.4-10) 
The banking sector 
1. Demand for time deposits: 
Tc -  = Tpt + 4  + 4- (2.5-2) 
2. The rate of interest on time deposits: 
'^t ^tt-1 ^(^b " ^ bp " Hf^* (2.5-5) 
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3. Demand for demand deposits: 
Dc = = "pt + + "nf (2-5-7) 
4. Level of legal reserves: 
Rt = ( D^  + ). (2.5-8) 
5. Desired currency balances: 
= Y(D + T). (2.5-9) 
6. Desired level of government securities: 
= P(D + T) + (2.5-10) 
7. Desired level of firms securities: 
= |i(D + T) + A^^r^. (2.5-11) 
8. Loan supply: 
L? - "(D; + y + - Chc_i): (2.5-15) 
9. Demand for rediscounting: 
4 = If, + 
r — T ' 
bft dt 
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4t ' • (2.5-22) 
10. Actual amounts lent each sector: 
^pt - {^pt- + (4t - i:%) + dot}: (2-5-25) 
4t • •»" i:% + (:pt - i:pt) + "ij-
11. Rates of interest on bank loans: 
'^bpt " ^bpt-1 •*" %%t-l ' ^pt-l) ^p(^pt-l"^npt-l)' (2.5-27) 
^bft " ^bft-1 *f(Lft-l ' ^ft-1^ ^^(^bft-l"^nft-l)' (2.5-28) 
12. Contribution to public's income: 
- fk«iw- (2-5-«) 
The intermediaries 
1. The supply of deposits: 
N = = N^. (2.6-1) 
2. Supply of loans: 
'•I - V + (2 6-3) 
= 'p 4 + ^ 8('npt - Vt)= (2 S-8) 
i^t-^pi:« + =i8('„pt - W- (2-S-9) 
3. Desired level of government securities: 
= g N + A r . (2.6-4) 
n n 15 n 
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4. Desired level of demand deposits: 
= V + 46'.-
5. Desired level of firm's securities: 
D — b" = b N + A-_r . (2.6-6) 
f n 17 n 
6. Desired currency balances: 
C° = c^N. (2.6-7) 
7. Actual amounts lent: 
K+ 4" - 4")' '•np} • (2-6-11) 
8. Rates of interest: 
^nft+1 " ^nft^ ^ 19^^nft " ^ ft^ ^^S^^nft ~ ^bft^ ' (2.6-16) 
^npt+1 " ^npt''' *2o(^npt " ^ npt^ ^'2o(^npt ' ^bpt^' (2.6-17) 
'nt+l = 'nt + *21^' - t%p - ^nf). (2-6-18) 
9. Intermediaries contribution to public's income: 
< = "n - ^ kAnf (2-S-28) 
The public sector 
1. Desired level of demand deposits: 
V°Vt-^^2'p- (2-7-1) 
2. Desired currency balances: 
V"Vt+^3'p- (2-7-2) 
3 
4  
5  
6 
7 
8 
9 .  
10, 
11,  
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Desired level of time deposits: 
(2-7-3) 
Demand for the consumption good: 
- c 7; + Vp- (2-7-4) 
Desired level of government securities: 
(2.7-5) 
Demand for bank loans: 
(2-7-®) 
Demand for intermediary loans: 
(2-7-8) 
Demand for firms ' securities 
VVt+'^29\- (2-7-8) 
Demand for deposits in intermediaries; 
"pt • Vt + '^30%- (2-7-9) 
Gross income: 
\ + \t * \t + ht* fgtGpt + fnt^pt + (2-7-10) 
Disposable income: 
= (1  -  t )  Yj. .  (2 .7-11)  
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CHAPTER III. SOLUTION WITH A PASSIVE GOVERNMENT 
Here we consider the effects of changes in the variables of the model 
on the stock of money and vice-versa under the assumption that the govern­
ment is essentially passive. That is, the government does not engage in 
active monetary or fiscal policy. The reserve requirement, r, is 
* * 
fixed at r ; the discount rate is fixed at r^; and the government is a 
passive supplier-absorber of government securities. 
The solution to the model concentrates on two areas: first, the 
effects of changes in the variables in the model on the stock of money 
and second, the effects of changes in the money stock on the variables 
of the model. In the first case the solution is designed to yield the 
following expressions: V r, |p V V X, a total of 13 
expressions (M the dependent variable). In the second case, we 
consider V X, ~, ^  V P, and V r, 13 more expressions (M the 
independent variable). Due to the complexity of the model to be solved 
ÔM SP 
it is not in general true that (for example) qkE" ~ ^  ^  Thus, 
different methods of solution will be used in each case in order to avoid 
making such (possibly) erroneous assumptions. 
An Expression for the Money Stock 
Time deposits and deposits in the intermediaries are not considered 
to be part of the stock of money. (These could be easily included in 
the analysis by simply adding T and N to Equation 3.1-1 below.) The 
stock of money in existence in period t, M^, is thus simply the sum of 
all currency holdings and all demand deposits: 
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"t - St + %t + + <=£t + "pt + + °£f (3-^-1) 
Substituting the appropriate expressions from Chapter II for each 
of the expressions in 3.1-1 and simplifying, we obtain 
M = (a^ + d^)(PX) + (d^ + c^)N + (k^ + kg)? + (3.1-2) 
(D + T) + fpCAgg + A23) + r^Ag + r^Aj^g. 
(The t subscript has been dropped in 3.1-2.) Substituting the expressions 
for N and D+T from Chapter II yields an expression for M in terms of 
PX (the value of goods produced), Y (disposable income), the various 
rates of interest and the parameters of the model. 
M = PX(a^ + d^ + n^d^ + n^c^ +Y + Y + yd^n^) + (3.1-3) 
7(4% p + Vp + + k; + Ydn"p + Y»! +YV + 
Tpl (<in + *23 "*"^*24^ 
rjKdn + + (1 +V)A^ +YA^] + 
yd +y)Ai61 
Using C^, ..., for the parameter terms in 3.1-4 we have, 
M = PX C, + Y C_ + r C„ + r- C, + r C_. (3.1-4) 
1 Z p J t 4 n 5 
This expression for the money stock plays a key role in the solution of 
the model. 
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Solution with M as the Dependent Variable 
The solution in this case begins with differentiation of Equation 
3.1-4. This yields the following equations: 
5M 
âr. 
pôP âX 
^ iUtT ^ c ^ c 
f f 
ÔP 
 ^ + âi; %k + 57; fkj (3 .2-1)  
3Y ^^f 
^2 07" + ^ 337: +^4 ôr 
f f 
+ C 
Sr 
n 
5 9r, 
r BP Sx 3p ax, -, 
I;-- - CiL 5;=- Xc + fc + — 
° np np np np np 
+ <=2 If- + <=3 ^  + <=4 ^  + <=5 ^  • 
np np np np 
ôr ^ 
where the are vectors of partial derivatives; for example, 
9X ôr 3r Sr. âr _ âr 
5^ '  ".âf 
3M 
âY 
= c.[ ÔY c 
ar 
ax 
c 
BY c 
3P, 
X + :;:f: p_ + âf "Sc +  ^ÔY "kJ + (3.2-9) 
•f Sr ar^ 
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If-X 
c 
âX ap. 
%c + aF" fc + a?- %k + aT PkJ (3.2-10) 
=2 fr <=3 âp^ <=4 5/ •" <=5 jr 
c c c c 
aM _ 
ap,. (3.2-11) 
aM 
ax. ^+âT^c+âîr 
c c 
^Sc+aT^k 
CziNc" + '3âx^ + C4 + Csâir 
c c c ( 
n 
M. = 
a%k 
(3.2-12) 
(3.2-13) 
This system of 13 equations contains the following unknowns: 
Sr. 
1. —— V i,j (=1 when i = j) 
j 
^ V P, r 
4. If Ï X, r 
5. a|_vp 
6. If VX 
(56 unknowns); 
( 8 unknowns); 
( 4 unknowns); 
( 4 unknowns); 
( 2 unknowns); 
( 2 unknowns); 
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7. 
8 .  
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
ay V r 
P- v x .  P 
BP. 
i j 
5Y 
Sp 
3r 
oP 
V P 
Vr, p 
ax.  
pj ^ 
aL. 
ax 
ùJL 
ax 
ax 
VP, X 
vx 
V r, X 
8 unknowns); 
4 unknowns); 
2 unknowns); 
2 unknowns); 
16 unknowns); 
2 unknowns); 
4 unknowns); 
2 unknowns); 
16 unknowns). 
Expressing the unknowns in one above in matrix form we have 
•fnf 
"fnp 
""gf ^nf ^tf ^bff ^bpf ^nff 
1 
^ng ^tg ^bfg ^npg ^nfg 
^gn 1 ^tn ^bfn ^bpn ^nfn 
'^gt ^nt 1 ^bft ^bpt ^nft 
^nbf ^tbf 1 ^bpbf ^nfbf 
^gbp ^nbp ^tbp ^bfbp 1 ^nfbp 
^gnf ?^nnf ^tnf ^bfnf ^bpnf 1 
^gnp r nnp 
r 
tnp ^bfnp ^bpnp ^nfnp 
npn 
npt 
^npbf 
"^npbp 
npnf 
1 
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art ar 
where r. . = -—. For example, r, ^  = r . The series of I's down 
ij ar j bfnp Sr^p 
the principal diagonal are the r^^. 
Below are the relations describing how the various rates of interest 
are assumed to change over time: 
^nft " ^nft-1 •*" ®19^^nft-l ' ^ft^ ^19 (2.6-16) 
(^nft-1 " ^ bft-l)' 
'npt ' 'npt-1 + - tpt-l) + ''20 ( . 2 . 6 - 1 7 )  
'nt° V-1 + *21(^1 • ^ np • 
't - 'tt-i + - itp - (2.5-5) 
'bpt - %t-i + »p<-i -
^^bpt-1 ^npt-1^' 
'btt = Sft-l + + "f 
(^bft-1 ' ^nft-l)' 
^f " ^ft-1 ^^®ft-l " ®ft-l^' 
^g = fgt-l - 8(Gt_i - Gt-l)' 
Differentiation of these relations with respect to the r's 
reveals that the terms in the "interest-interaction" matrix above 
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depend on the effects of changes in the r's on the quantity demanded 
and quantity supplied of loans and of firms securities; the quantity 
demanded of government securities; on institutional linkages between 
various rates (such as between the rates charged by different sectors 
on loans to the public and the rates charged by the banks on loans 
to the various sectors); and on the sensitivity of rates on deposits 
to either an excess supply or demand for loans in the previous period 
(the sizes of a^g, a^Q, a.^^, a, a^, etc.). Differentiation of this 
system would yield a system of 56 equations in the 56 interest-
interaction terms and ^ V r, ^ V r, X, and ^ V r,P. Differentia-
or ôr or ' 
tion with respect to Y will yield expressions for the Multiplying 
this result fay V p will yield expressions for VP, while 
multiplying the original result by ^  V x gives •!§ V r,X. More of 
this later. 
The expressions for , "ir , and V r can be obtained by 
or oX 
differentiating the expressions for Y, 
Y = PX + TT|j + TT^ + rgG + r^Tp + r^N^ + r^B^^ - - ^nf^nf 
with respect to each of the r's, P's, and X's. 
mu r SP ax dX ÔP - ^^i , . , The expressions for —, —, and can be obtained 
from the implicit supply and demand functions for X^ and X^. These 
are 
Sk = Sk^k' fc- r) (3-2-14) 
"k ' \ffk- (3.2-15) 
93 
Se = Sg(P^, r. Y) (3.2,16) 
°c = ^c' (3.2-17) 
The general technique is to differentiate both the supply and demand 
equations for one good with respect to the r's (or Y) and then impose 
the equilibrium condition that = D^. For example, differentiating 
3.1-14 and 3.1-15 w.r.t. r^ yields 
ôr^ ôr^ ÔP^ 3r^ ôr^ 
3*k adk aPk aT 
31:;= Sp; 5^ ;+ sr ^  5^ . 
At equilibrium -it— dr^ = ?— dr^, so that 
^ ôr^ f ôr^ f 
^ ^^ k ^^f aPg ar^ Ô- argV f 
(3.2-18) 
Cancelling dr^ from both sides, and simplifying 
fh ,-Î!L_Zç_^!£ S_ . (3.2-19) 
Differentiating 3.2-16 and 17 with repsect to r^ and following the same 
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procedure 
ÔP 
ç 
ôr, 
ÔP xôd 
k f ç 
ôr, \âP, 
ôs , — /ôd 
ç \ , dr / c 
Sff dr 
ôs 
ç 
ÔP 
ôd 
ç 
ÔP 
(3.2-20) 
Equations 3.2-19 and 3.2-20 form a system of two equations that can be 
ÔP ÔP 
solved simultaneously for the unknowns and Repeating this 
ÔP f f 
procedure will yield ^  V P, r. 
M 
ôr" 
The same system (3.1-14 to 17) is used to solve for We start 
with an equilibrium situation where Sj^ and d^ (the K and C subscripts 
have been omitted since the technique is the same for both). See Figure 
14 below. 
IL . 
||X2=^2""2 
4-i=d|=X| 
Figure 
i 
14. Changes in P and X 
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We then imagine a change in one of the elements of r that results in a 
shift in both the demand and supply curves to and S^. This results 
in changes in both X and P. The expression for ^  has been developed in 
the last paragraph. The equilibrium change in X is obtained in the 
following manner. 
a? , _ , , - Sr 
*2 • dk(Pl + 57 <>'. Te + ~ 37 
3P — 
= + If  '''• ''c + sr ^ 
The change in X, given the change in r is simply X^ - X^ or 
3P — 
dr. +5^ dr, 7 +|I- dr) - (P^. P_^. r) 
(3.2-21) 
# - "k # <*'• ^ d':. H • \<lf ^ i 
In the limit as Ar ^ 0, ^  -* ^  which is still given by either expression 
in 3.2-21. Repetition of this process yields — VX, r. 
The expressions for ^  and ^  are obtained in an analogous manner 
01  0  1  
which will not be repeated here. The same technique is also used to 
3Pi 
obtain expressions for —— , 
aPj 
3Xk ax^ 
The expressions for —— and —— can be obtained directly from the 
^ c 
transformation function. These relations obtained by differentiating 
the transformation function hold only in a situation of full employment. 
At least than full employment, these rates of change may approach + ™ 
if the economy begins to utilize previously unused capital and/or labor. 
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ÔX. 
The expressions for —^ are obtained in a manner analogous to the 
^ i 
above by differentiation of the supply and demand functions and the 
imposition of the equilibrium condition that quantity supplied equals 
quantity demanded. 
Before commenting further on the solution with M as the dependent 
variable we will consider the solution with M as the independent variable 
because of the close similarity of the technique in this case and that 
used above. 
Solution With M As the Independent Variable 
The rates of change we wish to develop here measure the effects of 
changes in the stock of money on the key variables in the model. Thus, 
ax Y ap^ ap^ 
we are interested in obtaining expressions for —, 
and ^  V r. As indicated earlier, it is not sufficient to assume that 
these rates of change are simply the inverses of those obtained earlier 
due to the conplexity of the model. They may be, but in general it 
cannot be expected that they will be. 
To obtain the expressions for ^  and ^  the implicit supply and 
demand functions 3.2-14 to 17 are again used. Differentiation of 3.2-14 
and 14 with respect to M v-îî-ids 
- —- + —- —- + —- (3 3-1) 
SM a?^ ÔM aPg aM an ^ \ 
«T'apTâM" + Sp-Sr S^ SM- (3.3-2) 
K c r 
S®k ^^k 
Again, for equilibrium, —^ dM = dM so that, by equating 3.3-1 and 2 
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and simplifying we obtain 
an Ï7, âd: • (3.3-3) 
k , k 
3'c 
Proceeding in the same manner we obtain the expression for . This 
system can then be solved for —— and —— in terms of the parameters 
oM 5M_ 
of the supply and demand functions and 
9X ^ 
The expressions for ^  we obtained in the same manner in which 
ÔX 
those for — were obtained in section on solution with M as the dependent 
variable. Thus, 
- w m 
!fk ,/aPk 
ôM 
(3.3-4) 
^ ôP. ôP p.- ^ 
= «'iM- & "») 
and similarily for . 
The expressions for ^  are obtained from the relations in the 
9M 
section on solution with M as the dependent variable, describing the 
determination of various rates of interest. 
Each of these relations is differentiated with respect to M. In 
3 r 
general, the expressions for — depend upon the effects of changes in 
the money stock on the demand and supply of loans, firms securities, and 
government securities. These effects are, in turn, primarily dependent 
upon the influences of changes in the money stock on the various rates 
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of interest. This procedure yields a system of 8 relations in the 
which can then be solved simultaneously, yielding solutions in terms 
^ ÔY ÔX ÔP 
The expression for is obtained by differentiating the expression 
for Y, 
Y = P X  +  T r b + T T  + r G  +  r  T  +  r  N  +  r ^ B ^  -
n  g  t  p  n  p  f f p  
^bf^bf " ^ nf^nf' 
with respect to M, yielding 
| I = ^ P  + i x  + - ^ P  + —  X , +  — +  ÔM c c k ÔM K ÔM 
ôn Bg ôr ôr ôr 
—— + r —^ H ^ G + —— T H E. r -f ÔM g ÔM ÔM p ÔM p ÔM t 
ôr ÔN ôr^ ÔB. 
—S M ^ £ j- ^ £ g ^ ÊE r- -
ÔM p ÔM n ÔM fp ô M f 
/ ÔY ôT^i . (" ÔY ôr . 2^2. - f f 3? - f ôrN 
S _ g 
'bf = r / ôpx ôTA . ^nf _ r ÔPX ^^n ôr A 
ÔM 7V ' "SmJ ' ~§M 8 L ÔM ' ÔM ' ÔM J' 
(3.3-5) 
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The "Solution" 
The preceding two sections together yield a system of simultaneous 
equations which could be solved yielding expressions for ^  and ^ 
(where — represents the variables of interest) in terms of the parameters 
(the elements of A^, etc.) alone. No attempt has been made to push 
the solution to this level. The size and complexity of the resulting 
expressions would obscure, rather than illuminate their economic meaning 
and significance. Consequently, we will continue to express these 
relations in terms of partial derivatives, indicating when necessary 
what variables they depend on. This procedure increases the ease with 
which the results can be interpreted. 
The key results from the previous sections are reproduced below. 
ÔP ÔX ÔP ÔX -, 
âF: Xc + ËC: Pc + + o-z-i) 
f f f f 
Sr Br ôr 
2^ "1" S S ^  S 
+ (3-2-2) 
g g g g g 
Ôr. ôr ôr 
2^ ST" + C] 3;- + 32% + Cg ggS 
g g g g 
ÔM ÔP ÔX ôp, c „ . c _ k 
+ (3-2-3) 
Il n n n n 
Ôr- ôr ôr 
^2 "ST + S "Sr + ^ 4 ^  + ^ 5 ôT-
n n n n 
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9M 
ôr^ 
Bp Sx Sp, 
• <=![ \ + â? + sr \ + (3-2-4) âr^ ^k. 
. ôr ôr ôr 
S Ô;; + S •st; + <=4 + S ^  
ÔM 
ôr bf 
- x [  
ÔP ôX ÔP, 
=^ 0 + â± + Sî-\ + 5Ï-\J + (3-2-5) 
= '^^ bf *"= ' S'bf bf 
Sr^ ôr ôr_ 
^2 ^  + ^ 3 ÏÏTT: •*" ^4 ^  + Cg âg-
bf bf bf bf 
ÔM 
ôr bp 
ÔP ÔX ÔP, 
3%- Xc + FF-- Pc + FT- \ STT \-l + (3 .2-6)  
bp bp bp bp 
_ ôr^ ôr ô7 
Cz + C] 3;:- + ^ 4 + ^ 5 s;:-
bp bp bp bp 
ÔM 
ôr 
= C, 
nf 
•ÔP 
-ôr 
nf 
X + ^  
c ôr 
ÔX ÔP, ÔX, 
nf nf 
+ (3 .2-7)  
ÔY ôr ôr 
S 3F- + S ST" + <=4 + <=5 5  ^
nf nf nf nf 
ÔM 
ôr 
np 
= C, 
rÔP ÔX 
*C + ô7^  
ÔP, 
-ôr 
np np 
ÔY 
' 2  F r  
np 
ôr, ôr 
"np 
ô7 
Pc + 3?^ - %k + à?-- fk] + (3-2-8) 
np 
"3 51 + C, T-G- + C 
n 
np 
% 5 
np 
5 FI 
np 
H ~ ^1 
ÔP ÔX ÔP, 
L ^ \ + FT 
ôx^ 
Ff \ "^FT 
ôr ôr ôr 
+ C3 Sy- + C4 25% + Cg SyS 
(3 .2-9)  
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dM 
ÔP = Cl [ 
ÔX 
X + 
c 
C„ ^  + C, 
ôr. 
-1 
-5P-^ + 5p- fkJ 
G c 
Ôr ôr 
^4 5/ + S 6p 
+ (3.2-10) 
âM rôP 
= C, C 
î  
ÔX 
LSp: *0 + 5p^  Pc + Xk + 3p: ^kJ 
ÔX. 
g ôr ôr 
G; 3Fr + C3 3?: + C4 af+ c 
k k k 
07 
n 
5 SpT 
k 
(3.2-11) 
5#- - C] 
c 
c 
c c 
L ôx_ " • ôx_ \  ÔX_ \J 
ôr. 
C 
c 
ôr ôr 
^^2 H" + *=3 mT + <=4 âif + <=5 âiT 
C c C C 
(3.2-12) 
awL = c. 
r ÔP ÔX 
ââ: X; + + 
ÔP, 
k - aXk 'c ' a%k + ''kJ (3.2-13) 
ôv ôr 
S 35^  - S 35;; + <=4 + 
>, + |i(!!fc. !!i-) 
® V ^ 3Î a?/ ÔP, ÔM VôP k ^  ç_ 
ÔM 
ÔP, 
5 
ÔP. k 
(3.3-3) 
aPk r 34c as,. ^ aa 
-sîT/l + 
ôs ôd (3.3-3a) 
ÔP ÔP 
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sïT " \ C §ïr ôM (3-3-4) 
dp, dp 
\ C SîT SF" Sm 3*0 
ôïf = ^c C ÔM^» M' Im) (3.3-4a) 
~ k V ÔM ' 5m~* ôM' ÔM J 
ay 
S M °  S M "  P c  +  S â T  X c  +  s r ^ ' k  +  5 i r \  +  ( 3 . 3 - 5 )  
ÎISg + + 
ÔM ÔM g ÔM ÔM p ÔM p 
d T  a r  d N  d r  
îï^\* âif'n+ ââr *fp + 
!!fE, r!Zw, + !!M, , *' 'f ,  
ÔM f " V ÔM bf ÔM bf ÔM 
ÔM 'ne) 
We have indicated previously how the terms on the right-hand side of 
the relations above can be obtained. We now attempt to examine these 
relations in more detail and to breathe some economic meaning into them. 
The expressions ^  depend upon the effects of changes in interest 
rates on prices, real output, income, and all other interest rates (as 
well as institutional factors which are represented by the values of the 
* 
constants C^). Consider an increase in one rate of interest, r . The 
following statements consider the effects on P from the supply side 
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âP * 
only. In general, —^ >0 when r is a cost to the firm (r^^, r^^, and 
r^ fall into this category), on the other hand, when r represents a 
ic 
return to the firm (r^, r^, r ), the effects of an increase in r on 
ÔP 
prices will be less. Conceivably, in some cases, —^ for some P and 
* * Sr 
r could even be negative. When r represents a rate not directly 
related to the firms (r, or r ), will be very near zero. From 
bp np-" 
the demand side, an increase in r represents a potential increase in Y 
ic 
when r is r , r , r , or r_. In these cases, increased Y will also 
g n t t 
increase the demand for the demand for goods and thus tend to increase 
* 
P. When r is either r, or r the net direct effect on Y of an bp np 
increase in r will be zero since increased interest payments will 
result in increased profit distributions to the owners of the financial 
sectors. (Indirect effects on Y may be positive or negative depending 
* 
on the responsiveness of actual amounts lent to changes in r and the 
multiplier effects of changes in loans on income.) In general, therefore, 
we would expect -^ > 0. 
We would expect —5- < 0 when r was a cost of investment (r^, r^^:, 
3r 
or r _), in keeping with standard investment theory. Likewise 
aXc * 
—^ < 0 would be expected in this case since r represents a cost to 
ôr 
the firm. See Figure 15. 
Here AC'(> AC°) is the average cost curve after an increase in r . 
Notice that when we consider the demand side as well, it is necessary 
* 
to point out that Increased r causes an increase in Y which would tend 
to increase demand and thus X. This effect in general would not be 
large enough to offset the reduction in X noted earlier since that 
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P 
P  =  M R  
Figure 15. < 0 
reduction itself causes Y to fall, ceteris paribus. 
When r is not directly related to the firm (r, or r ) we assume 
Dp np 
—^ = 0. When r represents a source of income the firm (r , r^, r^) 
ôr ax 
we expect that —^ >0 (although these effects are probably small). 
ôr 
One straightforward way to think about these effects is to note that 
increases in these rates may reduce the firms ' dependence on financing 
provided by banks and intermediaries and thus permit greater self-
financed expansion. 
We have already referred to the effects of changes in r on Y as 
a secondary effect in discussing and . It also enters the 
ÔM 
expressions for —gp directly. The previous discussion will not be 
ôr 
repeated here. 
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ÔXi 
The interest-interaction tems enter the expressions via the 
last three terms on the right-hand side of 3.2-1 through 3.2-9. We 
hypothesize that -gp- ^  0 for all i, j. This is equivalent to saying 
that all interest rates tend to move in the same direction. Clearly, 
the size of the expression will vary depending on the closeness of the 
relation between the two rates. For some pairs we would expect this 
ôrfa 
relation to be quite strong (such as while for others it may 
ôr^ ^^bf 
be quite weak (such as —). 
nf 
We turn now to a discussion of the constant terms Cj^ through C^. 
C- = (a^ + d, + n-d + n_C + + yd N^). Table 3 contains 
1 5  f  f n  f n  f ' f ' n f  
the definitions of these terms and their signs. 
Table 3. Terms in C^ 
Term Sign Definition 
^5 
> 0 Coefficient of PX in firms' demand for currency 
> 0 Coefficient of PX in firms' demand for demand deposits 
«f > 0 Coefficient of PX in 
intermediaries 
firms' demand for deposits in 
^f 
> 0 Coefficient of PX in firms' demand for time deposits 
Y > 0 Coefficient of D + T in banks' demand for currency 
c 
n 
> 0 Coefficient of N in intermediaries' demand for currency 
d 
n 
> 0 Coefficient 
deposits 
of N in intermediaries- demand for demand 
Clearly, C^ >0. The value of C^ tells us by how much the money stock 
increases given a one dollar increase in FX as a result of the firms 
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increasing their demand for money (a^ and d^) and their deposits in 
banks and intermediaries which in turn cause these sectors to increase 
their demands for money (n^d^ - the increase in the intermediaries demand 
for demand deposits as a result of firms increasing their deposits in 
the intermediaries, etc.). The last term, Y d^n.^, is a "third generation" 
effect—the increase in banks demand for currency caused by an increase 
in intermediaries demand for demand deposits which was in turn a result 
of an increase in the firms' demand for deposits in the intermediaries. 
<=2 = (Vp + "n "p + ^  + Vp +Yy 
Table 4 gives the definitions and signs of the terms in not in C^. 
Table 4. Terms of 
Term Sign Definition 
n > 0 Coefficient of Y in public '8 demand for deposits in 
P intermediaries 
^1 > 0 Coefficient of Y in public ' s demand for currency 
^2 
> 0 Coefficient of Y in public 's demand for demand deposits 
^3 > 0 Coefficient of Y in public 's demand for time deposits 
Thus, Cg is clearly greater than zero. It's interpretation is analogous 
to that of Cj^, except it measures the effects of an increase in Y on 
the public's demand for money and the effects of changes in the public's 
demand on the banks' and intermediaries' demands for money. 
^3 [(^n * Y^n) ^ 30 ^  ^ Y)^22 ^23 ^^24^ 
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Table 5 gives the definitions and signs of the new terms in C^. 
Table 5. Terms of 
Term Sign Definition 
^30 Coefficient of r intermediaries^ 
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
^30 
< 0 Coefficient of r^ 
intermediaries 
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
^30 < 0 Coefficient of r intermediaries® 
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
^30 > 0 Coefficient of r intermediaries^ 
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
So < 0 Coefficient of r^ intermediaries 
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
So < 0 Coefficient of r, intermediaries ^  
in public ' s demand for deposits in 
o
 
< 0 Coefficient of r 
intermediaries"^ 
in public 's demand for deposits in 
^22 Coefficient of r^ in public's demand for demand deposits 
^22 < 
0 Coefficient of r^ in public's demand for demand deposits 
^22 < 
0 Coefficient of r in public's g 
r^ in public's 
demand for demand deposits 
®22 < 0 Coefficient of demand for demand deposits 
< 0 Coefficient of r^ in public 's demand for demand deposits 
^22 < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of r^p in public' s demand for demand 
^22 < 
0 Coefficient of r in public' s demand for demand 
deposits np 
23 
Coefficient of r in public's 
p 
demand for currency 
^23 
< 0 Coefficient of r^ in public's demand for currency 
^23 < 
0 Coefficient of r^ in public's demand for currency 
°23 < 0 Coefficient of r^ in public ' s demand for currency 
< 0 Coefficient of r^ in public's demand for currency 
^23 < 0 Coefficient of r^p in public'i s demand for currency 
^23 < 
0 Coefficient of r in public'; 
np 
s demand for currency 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Term Sign Definition 
^24 
Coefficient of r 
p 
in public's demand for time deposits 
®24 < 0 Coefficient of ^f in public's demand for time deposits 
< 0 Coefficient of r g 
r 
n 
in public ' s demand for time deposits 
^24 
< 0 Coefficient of in public ' s demand for time deposits 
^24 > 0 Coefficient of ^t in public ' s demand for time deposits 
^24 
< 0 Coefficient of 
^bp in public ' ; s demand for time deposits 
"24 
< 0 Coefficient of 
^np 
in public ' i s demand for time deposits 
Thus, with the exception of c^q and d^^, all terms in A^q, Agg, Agg, 
and Ag^ are negative since, with the exception of these two terms, 
they represent the coefficients of rates of interest on competing assets 
for the public. The interpretation of the actual terms in is 
straightforward. For example, (d^ + c^ 4- A^^ gives the inçact of 
changes in the public's demand for deposits in intermediaries (resulting 
from a change in some element of r^) on the intermediaries [(d^ + c^) A^q] 
and the banks' ( d^A^Q) demands for money. 
^4 = [(^n + Ca + yd^) A^ + (1 + y) + yA^] 
The new terms in are given in Table 6 below. Once again, all terms 
but Cg and d^ are negative since they represent rates on competing 
assets for the firms. The interpretation of the actual terms in 
is analogous to those of the previous C's. [(d^ + + yd^) Ag] for 
example is the effect of the firms changed demand for deposits in 
intermediaries on the intermediaries and banks' demands for money. 
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Table 6. Terms of 
Term Sign Definition 
Coefficient of r^ 
intermediaries 
in firms' demand for deposits in 
®9 < 0 Coefficient of r^ 
intermediaries 
in firms' demand for deposits in 
"9 < 
0 Coefficient of r 
intermediaries® 
in firms ' demand for deposits in 
> 0 Coefficient of r 
intermediaries 
in firms' demand for deposits in 
S 
< 0 Coefficient of r^, 
intermediaries 
in firms' demand for deposits in 
®9 < 0 Coefficient of r^^ 
intermediaries 
in firms ' demand for deposits in 
89 < 0 Coefficient of r -
intermediaries^ 
in firms ' demand for deposits in 
Coefficient of 
^f in firms' demand for demand deposits 
^6 
< 0 Coefficient of 
^f in firms' demand for demand deposits 
< 0 Coefficient of r 
g 
r 
n 
in firms' demand for demand deposits 
^6 
< 0 Coefficient of in firms' demand for demand deposits 
< 0 Coefficient of in firms ' demand for demand deposits 
^6 
< 0 Coefficient of 
^bf in firms demand for demand deposits 
^6 
< 0 Coefficient of 
^nf in firms demand for demand deposits 
Coefficient of 
^f 
in firms ' demand for time deposits 
a < 0 Coefficient of 
^f in firms' demand for time deposits 
b < 0 Coefficient of r g 
""n 
in firms' demand for time deposits 
c_ < .0 Coefficient of in firms' demand for time deposits 
d > 0 Coefficient of in firms * demand for time deposits 
67 < 0 Coefficient of ^bf in firms demand for time deposits 
gy < 0 Coefficient of 
^nf in firms demand for time deposits 
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Cg . (1 + Y) 
A-, is the coefficient of r in the intermediaries* demand for demand 
16 n 
deposits. Table 7 gives the signs and definitions of the elements of 
Table 7. Elements of (C^) 
Term Sign Definition 
®16 < 0 Coefficient 
deposits 
of 
^f 
j.n intermediaries* demand for demand 
^6 < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of in intermediaries' demand for demand 
^16 < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of 
'^n 
in intermediaries' demand for demand 
he < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of in intermediaries' demand for demand 
he < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of 
^nf 
in intermediaries ' demand for demand 
he < 0 Coefficient deposits 
of ^
np 
in intermediaries ' demand for demand 
Thus, indicates the effects of changes in an element of r^ on 
the intermediaries' demand for demand deposits as well as the secondary 
effect on the banks' demand for currency. 
The preceding discussion and descriptions provide us with the 
necessary material to interpret any of the expressions for for any r . 
m The expression for — contains the same five constants, through 
oY 1 
C^, described above. Both the derivatives of prices and physical outputs 
with respect to income will be positive for obvious reasons. The signs 
* 
of -r^ are given below in Table 8. 
Ill 
* 
Table 8. 
Term Sign Term Sign 
ôr ôr . 
° < 0 
ôr 
n 
w 
> 
< 
w 
< 
> 
-SF" 
> 
< 
ôr 
_2E 
ÔY 
> 
< 
The only sign in Table 8 that can be specified exactly without 
making further assumptions is that of ôr^/ôY which will be negative 
as increased demand for government securities will bid their price 
up and the rate down. The signs of the other terms depend on the relation 
between the impact of changes in income on the demand for loans and 
firms' securities and the supply of loans and securities. In a strictly 
partial equilibrium sense, we can say that if the impact on these 
demands is greater than on the corresponding supplies, the corresponding 
partial derivative will be positive. If the impact oi^ the supplies is 
larger than on the demand, the derivative will be negative. The question 
of the relative sizes of these effects is not one that can be answered 
without specifying the actual values of the parameters in the appropriate 
demand and supply functions. Thus, the answer must be provided either 
by assumption on the parameters (which would be only a tentative answer 
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subject to empirical verification) which we have, and will avoid, or by 
empirical estimation. We could (and will) argue, however, that, since 
it is to be expected that increases in income will tend to increase 
the money stock, if some of the are in fact negative, they cannot be 
so negative to cause the entire expression for ^  to be negative. 
The expressions for ^  also contain through as well as the 
partial derivatives of X^, X^, P^, P^, Y, and the r's with respect to 
ÔX 
the P's. The terms T—^ and are positive under our assumptions of 
° c ° k 
perfect competition. See Figure 16 below. 
Pq" MRn 
XoX, 
ÔX ôx^ 
Figure 16. and gp-
and are both positive because of the direct relation between 
PX and Y and since the terms and are (as we have argued earlier) 
k 
_c 
> 
c 
ÔP 8p, 
c _ , k positive. The terms and assumed to be positive in deference 
k c 
to the widely observed phenomena that prices tend to move together. 
ÔM 
Table 9 lists the remaining terms in the ^  and their signs. 
113 
Table 9. Ternis of 
Term Sign Term Sign 
5p-
c 
> 0 > 0 
Br 
c 
m 0 
ar 
< 
% 0 
Ô r 
n 
w 
c 
0 
8r 
n % 0 
0 - 0 
c 
> 0 
a^bf 
ai-k > 0 
^^bn 
dp 
c 
% 0 ^'bn 0 
> 0 ^^nf > 0 
Br 
C 
fa 0 
ôr 
eu 0 
The six terms whose signs are greater than zero simply reflect the 
fact that as prices increase, so does output thus increasing the firms' 
demands for both internal and external financing and thus, ceteris 
paribus, the rates of interest paid on the various types of financing. 
The notation 0" is used for the other terms to indicate that they 
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are "nearly" zero, but must be positive since by our assumption on the 
interest-interaction terms, all interest rates move together. The 
causality may, however, not run directly from a change in or to 
a change in the particular interest rate being considered. 
Thus, the terms and are positive once the assumption (not 
c k 
ax 
c 
a very startling one) is granted that 
k 
5 
ÔX 
C 
p . 
c 
and are the last of our key relations in which the five 
c 'k 
constants through enter. With the exception of the terms 
and all terms in these two expressions will also be positive 
K c 
for reasons analogous to those given in the previous argument. At less 
than full ençloyment these two terms can also be positive (as noted 
earlier) even though when operating on the transformation curve they 
must both be negative. Once again, there is no ambiguity about the 
ÔX 
signs of and as both will be positive, even with negative . 
c K j 
We turn now to an examination of the expressions in which M 
^k 
appears as the independent variable. The first two of these, and 
ôPc 
we have been assured by many, many economists, must be positive. 
Examination of 3.3-3 and 3.3-3a should, hopefully, reaffirm the 
quantity theory. Clearly, the denominators of both of these expressions 
^ k ^^c 
are positive since both and are negative the demand curves 
k c 
for Xj^ and are downward sloping. (These derivatives are sinçly the 
change in the quantities demanded given a change in price.) What about 
Bs, âs 
Br 
Sj^ 
the numerators? The two terms and —- are negative since increases 
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in the elements of r represent an increase in costs and shift the firms' 
Ô d 3 d 
supply curve (MC) to the left. -3- and will both be positive as 
3 r 3 r 
quantity demanded will increase given the increase in income caused 
by increases in the elements of r. (This effect will be somewhat dampened 
if increases in r reduce loans significantly and thus indirectly the 
3d^ ôd^ 
amounts of and X demanded.) and can both be expected to 
c k 
be positive since increases in the P's will increase income and thus 
the quantities demanded. So far all the elements of 3.3-3 and 3.3-3a 
have the proper sign. The only potential source of trouble is in the 
signs of the elements of In general, we would expect these terms 
to be negative-increases in the money stock should it tend to reduce 
rates of interest. Thus, 3.3-3 and 3.3-3a will have the "proper" sign 
(be positive) only so long as gjj- 55- -
k k glp or or 
and likewise in the corresponding expression for . There seems 
to be little reason to think this inequality will not be satisfied 
since price effects should be more ynportant than interest rate effects 
on quantities supplied and demanded. 
The derivation of the expressions for and require no 
further comment since all they amount to is plugging in the equilibrium 
price change and subtracting from that expression the expression for 
the original quantity demanded or supplied. The signs of these terms 
depand on the direction of the effect of changes in M on the demand 
and supply curves as well as the location and shape of the initial and 
final curves. We hypothesize that increases in M cause both demand 
curves to shift to the right, because of the impact of M on Y. In the 
event that the supply curve shifts downward, both and •gjj- will be 
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positive. An upward shift in the supply curve is a necessary, but not 
ax. aXg 
sufficient condition for or to be negative. For negativity 
the reduction in supply must be appropriately large. Whether the supply 
curves shift upward or downward depends on whether, on balance, an 
increase in M increases or reduces average cost (and thus marginal cost). 
Interest expenses will tend to fall while the costs of labor and capital 
tend to increase. On the whole it must be concluded that increases in 
M tend to increase AC and thus to shift the supply curves to the left 
for at least a portion of the curve. If changes in M shift not only 
the position of the AC curve but also affect its shape significantly, 
the new supply curve (MC curve) may lie above the old curve for other 
ranges. The argument may be made that increases in M induce such 
significant increases in demand that firms are induced to build larger 
plants (perhaps through 0, the profits expectations variable as well 
as a result of increases in prices) once a situation like Figure 17 
consequently results. 
MColo'SUPPLYO^O 
SUPPLY 
AC NEW 
Figure 17. Effect of dM on MC 
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In the case illustrated in Figure 17 ^  is clearly positive. In 
ÔX ÔJC 
general, we will assume that and will be positive although it 
ÔX 
is clearly not true that in an n-commodity world ^  V X need be positive. 
Indeed, at full employment in even a two commodity world increases in M 
cannot result in changes in the amounts of both commodities produced. 
More on this point in the next part of this chapter. 
The terms in ^  are all positive. Clearly ^  is itself positive. 
Since Y is defined as money rather than real income this conclusion 
should be obvious. 
The relations described and discussed above contain the essential 
information provided by the model on the determination of the stock of 
money and of the effects of changes in the stock of money on the 
variables (prices, physical output, income, and interest rates) of the 
model. These expressions are, of course, rates of change and do not, 
by themselves, provide us with the actual amount of ch^ge in any 
particular circumstance. This information is derived in the following 
manner. We know that the money stock i% by definition, the sum of 
currency outstanding (C) and total demand deposits (D). Thus 
M = C + D. (3.4-1) 
Taking the total differential of this expression yields 
dM = -p d"? + II dY + -^ dPj^ + -^ dP^ + -^ dXj^ (3.4-2) 
or k c K 
c Or k c 
ÔD . ÔD 
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Equation 3.4-2 can be simplified to (since D + C = M) 
dM = — dr + dY + 
97 
c 
c k 
(3.4-3) 
The partial derivatives on the right hand side of 3.4-3 are the terms 
developed previously. Equation 3.4-3 provides us with the vehicle to 
calculate the change in the money stock resulting from a change in one 
or any combination of the variables r, Y, X^, X^, P^, or once the 
size of the change(s) is (are) known. 
Equation 3.4-3 is also a partial differential equation which could 
be used, given proper initial and boundary conditions to derive an 
expression for the money stock. 
ÔM r ÔM . r . r 8 p g 
M = 2 — dr + i ~ dY + 
r-l •' aT I % . (3.4-4) 
c 
where K is a conqposite constant of integration. Since we already have 
a perfectly good expression for M (see the first part of this chapter), 
this integration and specification of initial and boundary conditions 
will not be carried out. 
A Word on Full Employment and Equilibrium 
The questions of the stability, existence, and uniqueness of 
equilibrium as well as of full employment equilibrium are beyond the 
scope of this work. We have shown that the model can be solved for 
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the value of prices, outputs, income, interest rates, and the money 
stock and have developed the interrelations between these factors. 
What we have not shown (nor attempted to show) is whether or not this 
vector of solutions corresponds to a full employment vector of output. 
We shall assume that it is possible for our economy to reach full 
employment without specifying whether or not this occurs (1) without 
active monetary policy or (2) in conjunction with an "unacceptable" 
(however defined) rate of increase in prices. In fact, the next 
chapter is concerned with the effects and effectiveness of the various 
tools of monetary policy under two different assumptions about the 
state of the economy: (1) the economy is in an under-full-employment 
equilibrium (how and how effectively do the various types of monetary 
policy affect real output or employment) and (2) the economy has 
reached full employment with an unacceptable rate of price inflation 
(how and how effectively do the various tools of monetary policy 
combat inflation). 
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CHAPTER IV. SOLUTION WITH AN ACTIVE GOVERNMENT 
In this chapter we examine two major questions. First, how do 
the major tools of monetary policy work? That is, how do these tools 
affect the important variables of the model (in particular, the money 
stock and the various rates of interest). Second, given the effects of 
these monetary tools, how do they affect problems of unemployment and 
inflation? What are the qualitative and quantitative differences 
between the monetary tools? 
Changes in Reserve Requirements 
The reserve requirement, r, enters the model in two places. The 
level of required reserves and the quantity of bank loans supplied 
are both affected by changes in r. We have 
R = r(D + T) (4.1-1) 
= fj^(r)(D + T) + A^g^b (4.1-2) 
where we have used the function notation f^(r) to replace the term n 
in Equation 2.5-11 since this notation clearly shows the dependence of 
g 
on r. R is, or course, simply the level of required reserves. 
Expressions 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 indicate the effects of changes in r. 
Consider an increase in r, dr > 0. From 4.1-1 this has the obvious 
effect of increasing required reserves. 
dR = dr(D + T) (4.1-3) 
The immediate impact of this increase in R is a reduction in the banks' 
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holdings of currency, government securities, and firms' securities in 
an amount equal to dR. 
dR = dr (D + T) = d (G^ + + D^) (4.1-4) 
We assume that the banks reduce the levels of these assets in proportion 
to the coefficients of D + T in the banks' demand for them. That is, 
•"S - T+fm ® (4-1-5) 
s - p A -h Y ® 
Consider the banks' attempt to reduce its holdings of government securities. 
These securities may be purchased by either the public, the firms, the 
intermediaries, or the government (if it wishes to take some action 
to help offset the "crunch" of a change in the reserve requirement). 
We can then write 
dG, = dG + do. + dG + dG . (4.1-8) b p f n g 
We assume that dG^ is determined by the government strictly on the basis 
of economic policy and may range from zero to dG^. The amount of dG^ 
not absorbed by the government is divided among the private sectors 
in the following manner 
dG, - dG = dG + dG, + dG b g p f n 
% • g + «; + s, ("s -
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"«n = 8 H- g„ W=b - %> <4.1-11) 
where the g's are the major parameters in the sectors demands for govern­
ment securities. 
These three sectors pay for their purchases of government securities 
by reducing the level of all other (financial) assets they hold (except 
for firms' securities). The reductions in other assets for each sector 
are given by 
% = + (4.1-12) 
where A3 + % <4.1-13) 
'^ pg ~ + k2 + kg + Op (4.1-14) 
%g - U3 + % (4.1-15) 
®pg " ki + kj + kj + Hp ^®p (4.1-16) 
dGj = dDjg + dCfg + dN^g + dTf; (4.1-17) 
where dD^ g = d,, + + n^ , + 
•^Cfg = d; + ./! "Gf (4-1-") 
®£g = + a3°' n, + t, "«f (4-1-2'') 
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«fg'd-rÀiTTi: "Gf 
dG = dD + de (4.1-22) 
n ng ng 
d 
where dD _ = r—7-— dG_ (4.1-23) 
ng d + c n 
n n 
"«.g = d-4i- «n 
n n 
Again, the parameters in the preceding equations are from the sectors 
demands for the various assets. Ignoring for a moment the impact on 
interest rates, we can write the results of this initial sale of G by 
the banks as 
dD , = dD + dD^ + dD 
gl pg fg ng 
ki d^ 
+ kg + kg + n^ dj + a^ + n^^ + t^ 
+ -At (4-1-25) 
n n 
where dD^^ means the first change in demand deposits resulting from 
the banks* sale of government securities. By combining 4.1-25 and the 
system 4.1-9 through 4.1-11, we can write 
^®gl [C kj^ + kg + kg + n  ^C g + 
"N /• 84 ( J.  ^ r 1 
^ df + 85 + ttf + + gf + g^ 
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Cj;^) (s + % + gJ]  
dDgi f + tfl +i_!i!_^ \k, + k_ + k„ + n + n_ + d + c J i j p t 3 I t n n 
y dG, - dG  ^Q + g, + s ) 
Proceeding in a similar manner we can write the expression for the initial 
impact on time deposits resulting from the banks' sale of government 
securities as 
„ =(. h! + % ^ 
gl \k^ + kg + kg + n^ d^ + a^ + n^ + t^y 
• 
The expression for the initial impact on deposits in intermediaries is 
= ( !!e! +  ^
1 + kg + kg + n d^ + a^ + n^ + t^V 
dN , 
g ""1 ' "2 ^  3 ' "p "f ' 3 ' "f 
dG, - dG 
^ g 
8 + gf + gn 
(4.1-28) 
The initial impact on currency balances is given by 
dC 
_ (_ k2g ajgj 
gl + kj + df + *5 + a; + 
Vn_) "S -
+ c V d^  y^ g + gf + 8% (4.1-29) 
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We now examine the initial impact of the banks' sale of firms' 
securities. 
dF, = —7-^—-— dR = dF + dF . (4.1-30) 
b  p + ( j ) + Y  P  n  
Proceeding in an analogous manner, 
%'TTT- «b 
^ n 
df. - f-îîr- n- (4-1-32) 
n 
These purchases of firms securities by the public and the intermediaries 
causes a further reduction in their other assets, given by 
% = ®p£ + %£ + ®p£ + (4-1-33) 
"k*'* ""pf - k, + k_ 1 k, + n % (4-1-34) 
1 2 3 p 
'Sf = k, + kj! k3 + ®p (4-1-3=) 
n 
dN_^ = ;——r~n—TT" dF_ (4.1-36) 
k. 
•pf k^ + k2 + k^ + np p 
1V = iq-rqViçT-ï; %• (4-i-3') 
° ®nf + '!'=„£ (4.1-38) 
d 
where dD , = , dF (4.1-39) 
nf d + c n 
n n 
'"'nf = d +°c ®n (4.1-40) 
n n 
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The initial impacts resulting from the banks' sale of firms' securities 
are given by 
dD 
fl 
dT 
= C i + ^ 
V k- + k_ + k- + n^ d + c y 
1 2 J p n n 
( "3* •  ^
fl v. k, + k„ + k„ + n / f + b 1 2 3 p n 
dp. 
f + b 
n 
(4.1-41) 
(4.1-42) 
k„f 
dC 
fl 
= r & 
V k, + k„ + 
c b 
1 " "2 " ^3 "p n^ ' "n" 
n n 'N 
+ c y 
dN fl = Ck 
n f F, 
_E_ A b it) 
f + b 
n 
1 + k2 + kj + f + b, ' 
(4.1-43) 
(4.1-44) 
The total initial impacts on D, T, C and N are obtained by simply adding 
the appropriate pairs of equations and simplifying. 
dD, = 4.1-41 + 4.1-26 
+ k, + Bp 
(g + f) + n (S„ + b) c + d ^°n n 
n n 
r dG, T dG dp, 
b §. . b 
.] +(. 
Lg + gf + g^ f + b^J + ag + -f . -f. n, + t^D 
dGfc - -N 
^ g + gf + ga-/ 
(4.1-45) 
dT, = 4.1-42 + 4.1-27 
- CiTTT 
3 (f + 8) 
1 ' '"2 3^ 
dG, - dG dF, b _g_ . b 
+ 
g + gf + g„ f + \ ) 
r ^ r 
V d^ + a^ + n^ + t^y V g + gj; + g_y 8 f „ 
(4.1-46) 
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àC^ = 4.1-29 + 4.1-43 
_ X kg (f + g) (b^ + gj . 
- + kg + k, + np ^ 
r ^b , ^ , f ^ 
n ê + gj + ^ + a^ + n^ + 
y dG, - dG _ 
C g  % , + % )  
dN^ — 4.1-28 + 4.1-44 
.f—Aill^—) C , "S - % -N 
V + kg + kg + ny + b^ g + g^ + g^ 
'f ' ~5 ' "f ' T ^ + Sf + gq^' 
The sum of 4.1-45 and 4.1-46 gives us the initial reduction in bank 
deposits. This, of course, results in another reserve deficiency for 
the banks and thus initiates another round of asset adjustment through­
out the economy. The new level of required reserves is given by 
R new = (r + dr) [D + T - (dD + dT)] 
while actual reserves are now 
R actual = (r + dr)(D + T) - (dD + dT), 
so that the reserve deficiency is the difference between these two 
expressions, or 
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R def = (do + dT) [ 1 - (r + dr)] (4.1-49) 
In terms of Equations 4.1-45 and 4.1-46 
R def 4 
n r"'! V(g H-f) , 
_ k -  + k „ + k „  +  n  c  + d  ^^ n  '  n""  1 Z j p n n 
(g„ + b ) (4.1-50) 
•g + gf + i + \J 
[G gf + tf) •df + a^ + n^ + t^ V g + + g^. dG, - dG b :)]} 
I 1 - (r + dr) ]• 
Note that we can write 4.1-50 as 
k, + k„ 
 ^ + 4 + k3 + .p 
(4.1-51) 
df + tf 
dG^ + 
df as + n^ + t^ f n n C-^ ) 
(dG„ + dF„)_j [1 - (r + dr)] 
where each term on the right-hand side is the size of one of the nonbank 
private sectors reduction of their holding of demand and time deposits. 
Furthermore, we know that 
dG 
dG. 
=  ( î T i p ^ ) [ C  +  % , ) -  « g ]  
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-(f-W (p +Y\J c + " 
-C t^)C +Y +„) dr (D + T) 
(4.1-55) 
(4.1-56) 
R def results in another reduction of the banks' holdings of govern­
ment securities, firms' securities, and currency which, in turn, causes 
another rearrangement of the asset portfolios of the various sectors. 
This complex process continues, forming infinite series of changes 
in assets. The solution revolves around the two problems: (1) finding 
the general expression for the series of reserve deficiencies and (2) 
finding whether or not this series converges and, if so, to what. 
We introduce the following notation: 
R def 1 = dr (D + T) 
(dG + dF ) + 
P P 
[1 - (r + dr)]. 
By substituting 4.1-52 through 56 into 4.1-51 we obtain 
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1 - (r Vdr) = Ck  ^XX + ( (s + g' + g ) 
[C p 4 +J R 1 - ®g] + (rW 
Cp +Y +|J.^ R def } + Ca^ + + „^ + ') 
{(TTi^)[(rnhT) 
- « g ] }  +  C A ^  ( W W  
[CpH-^^v) ® - %] + G^r) 
C p +  %+p)  "  ' ' '4 -
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that after its first 
purchase of government securities, the government purchases no more 
from the banking system while the readjustment process is working itself 
out. This assumption permits us to write the general expression for 
any reserve deficiency as 
P. k + k ^ 
% def j = LI ki + k, + k, + np) (%j + %j) + (4.1-58) 
4f + *5 + *f + tf + c* + d. 
(dGnj + dF^j)] [1 - (r + dr)] 
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where, because of our assumption about the government, 
''Sj ' C g + gj + C p + Y + u) ^  
<8 + % + g,)(7Ti-Mr) 
" C S + gg + C p + Y + M- ^ ^ 
« p j  - C f f r )  ( p  +  %  +  p )  • >  J - i  
«„j °CrïV) CTT^ th) ^ J-i-
Substituting these expressions into 4.1-58 and dividing through by R 
def j-1, we have 
R def j r ^1 + ^2 r f g (4.1-
R def j-1 L + kg + kg + n^ L Vg + gg + g^V 
C P +Y +M.) +Cr+T')Cp/Y+|i)] + 
r îilZf _^r b.  ^
^ df + 35 + ttf + tgV V g + g^ + g^y 
r e  ^ + _js_ \( !h  ^
Vp + Y + + d^ Lv g + gf + g^y 
C P +^Y + K f + b^) Cp +^Y + IJ-îi 
[ 1 - (r + dr)] . 
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This result holds for all R def j, j >4. Call this ratio of reserve 
deficiencies Q^. Then it follows that 
= Qr * def 4 = Q^R def 3 
= Qr => * def 5 = Q^R def 3 
R^efi-1 = Qr =>* def i = def 3 
The expression for the total reserve deficiency, R def T, can be 
written as 
00 
R def T = R def 1 + R def 2 + R def 3 + 2 R def i 
i=4 
(4.1-60) 
n 
= R def 1 + R def 2 + R def 3 + lim Z Q^R def 3 
n->" j=l ^ 
This infinite series will converge to 3 if j | < 1. Since each 
^r 
term individually in is less than 1, will be less than one due to 
its multiplicative structure. (If were greater than one, any change 
in the reserve requirement would have an infinitely large inçact on the 
economy since the total excess or deficit in reserves would be infinitely 
large (small).) 
We can write the total reserve deficiency as: 
R def T = R def 1 + R def 2 + R def 3 (1 + ^  ^ ) (4.1-61) 
^r 
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where 
k, + k 
•' - Q {( + + .P [ (g + I, + gX^^fir) 
dr(D + I) + C f 4 b - ) ( p  d '(0 +  T)] 
n ' 
+  C a , + % I I '  +  t P [ C s  +  I ^  +  g ^ )  
C +Y + J + 
n n 
b 
I 
'f ' ''n" n ^  ""n 
rr e -)(  !s + f-A_) 
LVp + Y + nV ^ g + g^ + gy Vb + c y 
C  p  +  Î  + n ) ]  }  -  ( r  +  d r ) ]  •  p + Y + 
There seems little reason to write 4.1-61 out in full except to 
underscore the complexity added when a model of the money mechanism is 
made just a bit more realistic. 
From the expression for R def T we can derive all of the remaining 
impacts on assets from the change in reserve requirements. The banks' 
decreases in assets are given by 
. J. Z R def T (4.1-63) p + Y + n 
P 
p + Y + M-
dG,. = n , r R def T (4.1-64) 
= p + ; + ^ a def T (^-1-65) 
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The corresponding increases in government and firms' securities held 
by the other sectors are given by; 
dG ^ + T C 0 T - O (4-1-66) pt g + gj + gjj V p + Y + 11 go. 
•"=„t - g +% + ( p +Y +n * T - "So) <4.1-67) 
dG -(t g + gj + gjj C p +V +1» * ^ - '"^go) (4.1-68) 
dF 
p t  f  +  b ^ V p + Y + M -
b 
C p + Y + a % ?) <4.1-69) 
= ft-T C p + Y + ^  ^ 0 <4-1-7°) 
The public's increase in assets is the sum of 4.1-66 and 4.1-69, or, 
'<= + ^ )pt = g ++ g, C TTfr? « - "«go) <4-1-") 
* £ + C p + Y + li ^ 0-
The intermediaries holdings of government and firms' securities 
increases by: 
+ "nt ' g + % + g^ CvrfiT ^ - o <4-1-'^) 
b 
+ TiV (7Ttin;Rd=£i). 
The firms' increase in assets is simply Equation 4.1-68. 
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The offsetting decreases in assets for the public sector are 
"St • k3 + 
dDpt ° k^ + k}+ k, + .p + f)pt: (4-1-74) 
"pt = k^ + k)+ k3 + d(G + ^ )pt> (4.1-75) 
"V = k, + k, + k, + n„ "(= + F)pt- (4-1-7S) 
The intermediaries' reductions in assets are 
'"nt = ^ 7^  ''(° -^  '^nt' (4-1-") 
®nt = rW "C: + (4-1-'») 
n n 
The firms' reductions in assets are 
"Cfe = d, + A n, + t, "«ft- (4-1-") 
f 5 f f 
""ft • d, + a;'+ n, + t, "«ft- (4-1-80) 
«ft = d^ + + t; "«ft' (4-1-81) 
dN,. = 4 ^ ^  ^ . dGf». (4.1-82) ft d^ + + n^ + t^ ft' 
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We can at last find expressions for the total reductions in assets, 
caused by the change in reserve requirements. 
dCj. — 4.1-63 + 4.1-73 + 4.1-77 + 4.1-80 
^2 
R def T + ^ ^ ^ „ d(G + F)„ + 
p + Y + + k2 + pt 
(4.1-83) 
c a 
d(G + F)_. + ^ ^ ^ ^ . dG, 
c + d ^ 'nt d^ + a- + n^ + t^ ft 
n n f 5 f f 
dD^ — 4.1-74 + 4.1-78 + 4.1-80 
k d 
• k, + k, + k. + + f)pt + T?d- + F).t+ 
1 2 3 P n n 
^ (4.1-84) 
dGj d^ + a^ + + tg ft 
dTj. = 4.1-75 + 4.1-81 
^3 
k^ + k_ + k„ + n ^ ^)pt d_ + a- + n^ + t_ 
i z j p  r : ) r r  ( 4 . 1 - 8 5 )  
^«ft 
dN^ — 4.1-76 + 4.1-82 
% ttf 
ki + k2 + k3 + n? ^ ^^pt d^ + a^ + n^ + t^ 
(4.1-86) 
^St 
The total inçact on the money stock of the increase in reserve re­
quirements is simply the sum of 4.1-83 and 4.1-84. 
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dM„ . d(c, + = p + ; + ^ R det I + 
kg + k 
Lk, + k, + trir ] "«= + F)pt + + f).t 
1 " 2 " -3 " "P 
dG 
*5 + df 
Ldj + ^ 5 + «t + tfl ft 
which is, of course, negative in the case of increases in the reserve 
requirement. This same expression holds for the case of reductions in 
r, in which case it will be positive. 
Nothing has been said yet about the changes in the prices of govern­
ment and firms' securities necessary to induce the various nonbank 
sectors to either buy or sell the amounts necessary for the relations 
just developed to hold. Without the appropriate changes in prices 
(rates of interest), the asset readjustment process just described 
cannot occur. Again, we will consider the case of an increase in reserve 
requirements. (In the opposite case, the argument is essentially the 
same with only the signs changed.) The question here is by how much 
must the prices of government and firms' securities fall (the rates 
increase) to induce the various nonbank sectors to increase their hold­
ings of G and F as given by Equations 4.1-68, 72, and 73? (Note that 
the effects of a change in the reserve requirement on the rates on time 
deposits and deposits in thé intermediaries will not be direct, but 
will be the result of the effect of dr on r and rAs these rates g f 
increase, r^ and r^ will tend to follow.) We can write the aggregate 
demand for G and F (excluding the banks' demand) as 
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G° = gY + + gj(PX) + A,,; (4.1-88) 
• V ^7'n + -p" + '^30'p (4.1-89) 
Writing these expressions in terms of only the variables that are directly 
affected as a result of the change in the reserve requirement, we have 
= (Sy + a^^ + a2g)r^ + (b^ + b^^ + l'26^^g ®n^ (4.1-90) 
Fa = (a^y + ^ 30^^f ^^17 ^n^ (4.1-91) 
The immediate changes in r^, r and N must be such that dG^ = 4.1-66 + f g a 
u, 
67 + 68 = p y ^ R def T. We already know that the total change in 
N is given by 
^^t = + kg I kg + np ^(G+%t + dprjpriÇTT^ (4.1-86) 
dGft' 
Thus, 
" P + %H ® T = («7 + «15 + a26)drf + (4.1-92) 
(b? + + b2s)drg; 
K ' p + Y + n * def T . (8;, + a3p)drj + (b^, + (4.1-93) 
tsoidfg + V-
Substituting the expression for dN into 4.1-82 and 83 yields a system 
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of two equations in two unknowns, dr^ and dr^. Solving this system 
simultaneously yields expressions for the necessary increases in dr and 
ë 
dr^. 
^7 ^15 ^26 
17 30 
hi So 
^7 ^  ^15 ^  ^26 
^7 ^15 ^27 a^2 + a^Q ^^17 ^30^ 
(4.1-94) 
div = * def T 
fr a^^ + a^Q { p + Y + , - <hl7 + »30) (4.1-95) 
(a? + a^^ + a^^ ^ 
p + Y + ^17 + ^ 30 P + Y + [A 
^7 ^15 ^26 • (^17 "*• ^3o) 
-]} 
dN 
*17 + *30 
{ "n • (^17 + ""so' 
"n (»7 + h5 + *26) 
a, ^ + a 
r *17 + *30 " 1 I 
L  + b^3 + bgg - + b3Q) J  J -
The expressions for dM^^, dr^^ and dr^^ provide us with the 
necessary information to calculate the other effects on the economy of 
the asset-readjustment resulting from a change in the reserve require­
ment, r. To calculate the effects on income, for example, one need only 
combine the expressions developed in the last chapter for and 
g 
with the value of the appropriate differential to obtain the three effects 
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on income caused by the change in r: 
and 
2. the government security rate-induced effect 
or^ fr 
The same procedure can be followed to obtain expressions for the effect 
on prices, outputs, and the other rates of interest. 
Changes in the reserve requirement also affect the economy in another 
manner. The foregoing concentrated solely on changes resulting from a 
readjustment in the asset portfolios of the various sectors. Other 
effects work through the inq>act of a change in r on the banks' willing­
ness to supply loans to both the public and the firms. Equation 4.1-2 
S — (L^ = f^(r)(D + T)+A^2^^ ) serves as the basis for discussing these 
effects. Taking the total differential of 4.1-2, we obtain 
The quantity supplied of bank loans is reduced by an increase in r, 
ceteris paribus, for three reasons; 
1. an increase in r reduces D + T ^  < 0^ ; we have 
discussed this intact on D + T in the foregoing discussion; 
2. an increase in r reduces the amount that may be lent per 
dL^ = f^(r) dr + (D + T) ^  dr 
ôr 
+ ^ 12 dr-
(4.1-96) 
dollar 
3. an increase in r increases the rates on securities held as 
secondary reserves which, without an increase in loan rates. 
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reduces the amount banks are willing to lend per dollar of 
ôr ôr 
deposits (a^2 and b^^ < 0 combined with and > 0). 
Likewise, the quantity of loans demanded by the public and the firms 
will be reduced when r is increased since interest rates will move 
higher while income, prices and real output tend to fall as the money 
stock shrinks. Consequently, the actual amount of loans will fall 
which will, in turn, lower the demand for both the consumer and capital 
good, thus further depressing the level of economic activity in the 
economy. 
These effects on loans and demands could be calculated exactly 
in terms of the model, but the chain of causality seems so clear that 
this will not be done. Suffice it to say that the expressions developed 
earlier when only the asset readjustment effects of a change in r were 
considered, understate the various inçacts of a change in r on the 
economy since they do not take into account the inçact of dr on either 
the quantity of loans demanded or supplied. 
In quick summary, we have seen that changes in the reserve require­
ment affect the economy through two major channels: 
1. by causing a readjustment in the asset portfolios of the 
various sectors of the economy and 
2. by influencing the amount of loans made and thus the demand 
for goods. 
Working througjh both these avenues, changes in the reserve requirement 
are a powerful and diffuse technique for influencing the level of 
activity in our economy. 
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Changes in the Rediscount Rate 
The banks' demand for rediscounting is given by 
where d'^ 2: 0 when > L? H H and d^=0 otherwise. 
P f h =bp - ^d ^bf - ^ d 
No matter how great the difference between the rates on loans and the 
rediscount rate, no rediscounting occurs unless there is an excess demand 
for loans. 
There are two cases to consider when examining the effects of changes 
in the rediscount rate. First, there may be an excess supply of loans. 
In this case, neither increases nor -.reductions in r^ will have any 
effect on the economy since the change in r^ will not cause a change 
in the actual amount of loans, nor will banks have, solely because of 
the change in r^, any reason to change the rates on loans (even though 
these will tend to fall as a result, not of a change in r^, but 
because of the excess supply of loans). Second, there may be either 
an excess demand for loans or a situation of equilibrium in the bank 
loan market. We want to show that in this case changes in r^ will 
have an impact on the economy. Note that we are using the terms excess 
demand and excess supply of loans to refer to the difference between 
the aggregate quantity of loans demanded, and the quantity 
of loans supplied out of unborrowed reserves, . When > 
—.O 
L^, the possibility exists that the bank will engage in some rediscount­
ing; the actual amount will not, in general, be equal to this difference. 
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Examination of 2.5-20 shows that, since and d^ are positive 
constants, increases in r^ lower the amount of rediscounting banks are 
willing to engage in while reductions in r^ increase d^, ceteris paribus. 
Differentiating 2.5-20 with respect to r^ yields: 
BL"" 5Lf SL? " o C ^ - O  
SÎ: ° ^  + 57" • •5T" —[2— + (4-2-1) 
^ (%p - ""d) 
2 % - ="6) 
is negative 0. 
81°" 3Lf 
1. and — are negative because increases in r^ tend to 
d d 
increase r^^ and r^^, thus, lowering the quantity of loans 
demanded ; 
2. -5 is positive since increases in r and r, . will increase 
bp bf 
the quantity of loans supplied; 
ôr ^r 2 
3. both and are positive but less than, or equal to 1. 
^ ôr, ôr^j 
If ——^ and —r were greater than 1 (this is, of course, an 
°^b °^d 
ençirical question) we have the "perverse" case where an increase in r^ 
has such a strong impact on the rates banks charge that this induces 
them to increase their amount of rediscounting. (Remember we are dis­
cussing a situation where there may be an excess demand for loans. In 
such a situation, the "perverse" result is perhaps less unlikely.) 
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Let us now consider the effects of both increases and decreases in 
r^ under the possibilities of (1) prior equilibrium in the loan market 
and (2) prior excess demand in the loan market. 
By equilibrium in the bank loan market we mean that the actual 
amounts lent to each sector are equal to their quantity of loans demanded 
from the bank. This equality may or may not have been achieved through 
rediscounting by the banks. Consider first an increase in r^ coupled 
with equilibrium in the loan market. If equilibrium were previously 
achieved without rediscounting an increase in r^ will have no inçact 
on the economy since, ceteris paribus, the actual amounts lent and rates 
on bank loans will be unchanged. If, however, equilibrium were reached 
through rediscounting, the increase in r^ will reduce the amount of 
rediscounting the banks are willing to engage in, thus causing a 
reduction in the amounts actually lent to the other sectors. This 
raises the rates on bank loans and increases the firms' and publics' 
demand for loans from the intermediaries. If the intermediaries are 
unable to accommodate this increase in the quantity of loans demanded, 
total loans in the economy will fall, reducing income and the output 
of goods. Interest rates tend to rise. In the situation being 
discussed, a reduction in r^ will have no effect on the economy since 
the reduction in r^ will not cause either the public or the firms to 
increase the quantity of loans they demand. 
Consider a situation of excess demand for loans. Here, when r^ 
is increased, the actual amount of rediscounting will fall, increasing 
the excess demand for loans thereby driving r^^ and r^^ higher. These 
increases in turn result in increases in all other rates of interest. 
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As a result income and the output of goods will fall. On the other hand, 
a reduction in r, in this situation will increase the amount of rediscount-
a 
ing and thus the amount of loans actually made. This has the effect of 
increasing the demand for both the capital and consumer good, raising 
prices and output. The reduction in r^ also reduces the upward 
pressure on the loan rates which, in turn, tends to dampen down the 
increases in all other rates of interest. The effect is a general 
stimulation of economic activity. 
In many circumstances, changes in r^ have no effect on the economy. 
Even in the event where it does, the resulting changes in the level of 
economic activity are likely to be minor unless the change in r^ is 
very large. The effects are also transitory in the sense that any 
change resulting from a change in r^ will be swamped by the effects of 
other changes occurring in the economy. As Table 10 shows, changes in 
r^ have an impact on the economy only in disequilibrium situations 
(and only in particular sorts of disequilibria). Consider cases 6 and 
8 in Table 10. In these cases, rates of interest are being bid up by 
the excess demand for loans. Unless r^ is reduced enough to 
completely eliminate this excess demand, the total result in each 
case will be an increase in the rates of interest and either an 
unchanged or decreased amount lent by the banks. Only in case 7 in 
Table 10 does the change in r^ reinforce the major current of change 
in the economy. More of this later when we compare the effectiveness 
of the various tools of monetary policy. Table 10 summarizes these 
effects. 
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Table 10. Effects of Ar, d 
Situation Ar Effect 
d 
1. 1»^+ 1,06 < i-S 1 p f b ' None 
2. A Lf < 
P E I 
None 
3. 
Lf 
^ î None 
4. 
Lf 
<
—
 
None 
5. 
> 
d = 0 
tS 
h) t None 
6. 
A Lf > Actual amounts lgnt1'=> income, 
interest rates j, 
outputT ; 
7. d > 0 
Actual amounts lent^=> income, 
interest ratest 
output J, ; 
8. d': >0 ^  i 
Actual amounts lentT=> income, 
interest rates ^  
output t ; 
^As long as there is an excess demand for loans, interest rates tend 
to increase. When r^ falls these increases are less than they would 
have been without the reduction in r,. 
Open Market Operations 
To this point the government has been a passive supplier-absorber 
of government securities. It has not consciously attempted to buy or 
sell governments in the open market in an attempt to influence the level 
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1 
of economic activity. In this section we consider the economic impact 
of such activity by the government. 
Government purchases or sales of government securities affect the 
economy through two routes--(1) through their impact on the rate of 
interest on government securities and (2) through their impact on the 
level of bank reserves. Since these are also the primary routes through 
which changes in the reserve requirement affect the economy, the follow­
ing analysis will be quite similar to that in the first section of this 
chapter. 
ic 
Consider first a sale by the government of G dollars worth of 
government securities. For simplicity, we assume that this amount is 
purchased initially by each sector in proportion to the major parameter 
in their demand function for government securities. Thus, 
G* = dG + dG- + dG + dG, (4.3-1) 
p r n D 
where dG = — ^ — G* (4.3-2) 
P 8 + 8f + gjj + p 
g 
^ ^ ^ G* (4.3-3) 
f 8 + §£ + Sjj + p 
ir 
'n 8 + 8f + 8% + p dG = % — G (4.3-4) 
dG, = —: ^ G* (4.3-5) b g + gf + g* + P 
We have allowed for government purchases or sales of government 
securities in the first section in conjunction with changes in the 
reserve requirement. 
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The increased holdings of G require each sector to reduce the level of 
other assets they hold. Thus, 
do = dC + dD + dF + dT + dN (4.3-6) 
P P P P P P 
dCf = dCj + dDg + dT^ + dN^ (4.3-7) 
dG = dC + dD + dF (4.3-8) 
n n n n 
dG^ = dC^ + dFy. (4.3-9) 
For each sector we can write; 
% ° + k, + k, + Rp + f % 
% - k^ + k, + k, + + f % 
% = k^ + k^ A3 + n, + f "S (4-3-12) 
" k, + k; + k, + n, + f % (4-3-13) 
""p ' k^ + k, + n, + f (4-3-14) 
- a^  + ô/+t^ + •'«£ (4-3-15) 
"=£ (4-3-lS) 
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• T-r^ rrp^  ^ '"t (4-3-17) 
«£ - I-TdTTETT^ (4.3-18) 
dc. - c /d +h •"=„ (4-3-19) 
n n n 
dOn = e fd +b 
n n n 
%  = c  H - S  + b  (4.3-21) 
n n n 
dCb = fïir "«b (4-3-22) 
"b=7^ "«b- (4.3-23) 
The immediate result of this first round readjustment in assets is 
that deposits in the banks have been reduced by 
d(D+T) = dD + dD. -f dD + dT -f dT^ 
p f n p f 
k, + k, I + f (%) + (4-3-24) 
a, X + ,, (*f) +c /d +b ("=.). 
5 f f f n n n 
which results in a reserve deficiency equal to 
R def 1 = (1 - r) d(D + T). (4.3-25) 
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The banks are now forced to reduce their asset holdings in an amount equal 
to the reserve deficiency. Thus, 
R def 1 = dC, 1 + dG, T + dF, ^ . (4.3-26) 
Di Di Di 
Once again, the nonbank, private sectors must be induced to expand their 
holding of G and F. (We assume that, in this case, the government will 
not buy any of its securities from the banks.) Offsetting reductions in 
these sectors' holdings of C, D and T must result. We have then. 
•"Si ° + ®tl + (4.3-27) 
®bl = %1 + ®„1' (4-3-28) 
where 
' g + + g. (4-3-29) 
"Gfl • g + I' + Sa dGbl (4-3-3°) 
"=-1 ° (4-3-31) 
dfpl = flTTr- ®bl (4.3-32) 
• n 
''VTtV ®bl- (4-3-33) 
n 
The resultant decreases in assets of the nonbank-private sectors are 
given by 
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= h + 1=3 + + «pi» (4.3-34) 
"pi = + k}+ k3 + (%1 + %1> (4.3-35) 
%1 - k, + k)+ k3 + Op (dGpl + dfpl) (4-3-36) 
"pi ' k^ + k}+ k3 + Op (%1 + "'pi) (4-3-37) 
dCfl - ag + d/+ ''«fl (4.3-38) 
""fl - iJTipr^TTlÇ ^«£1 (4-3-39) 
"fl • a, + I; + t, + dCfl (4-3-4°) 
"fl = 33 + d'/+ t, + ,, "Gfl (4-3-41) 
•'<=„1 • (dG.l + dF.l) (4-3-42) 
n n 
d 
_n 
+ 
n n 
a\.i - T-T-d- (dG.i + df.i)- (4-3-43) 
These asset readjustments result in a second reserve deficiency, 
R def 2, given by 
(k^ + kg) 
'1 ^2 ^3 • "P 
R def 2 = (l-r)[ t, + L -f I ("^l-^^l) + (4-3-44) 
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». + df I If + t. «"=£!> + rVr (dC.l+dF.i)] 
5 f f f n n 
As in the first section of this chapter we can write the banks' reduction 
of their asset holdings for any particular stage of the process as: 
dGbl = p + Y + w i-1 (4.3-45) 
"Si • p + V + v. (4-3-4G) 
dfbl = p + ; + p K def i-l. (4.3-47) 
The problem can again be reduced to finding the general term in the 
00 
infinite series 2 (R def i) and then finding the limit to which this 
i=l 
series converges. The expressions for R def 1 and R def 2 are not 
comparable because of differences in the constant and variable terms 
in each. It is necessary therefore to examine some of the higher order 
reserve deficiencies. The general expression for these terms is 
^1 ^ " 
"1 ^ ^2 3 ' "p 
R def 3 - (1 - r)[ + ; + (%j_l + %j-l) (4.3-4S) 
d + t d 
^ ^ /An \ _L ^ 
*5 + + =f ^  ^ c. + 4. 
for j ^  3. The expressions for the dG and dF can be written as: 
° ( s + If + P 
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d G  = f — — - i — — — p — T )  
fi + gj + g^ ^ P + Y + tiV R def i-1 
dG 
ni 
= r != X e .-) 
^ + gf + ^ P + Y + M»/ 
R def i-1 
'pi ~ Cf + Cp + Y + M-) R def x-1 
'ni ^ Cf + b D Cp + Y + M.) ^ 
n 
Substituting these expressions into 4.3-48 we obtain an expression for 
R def j in terms of R def j-1: 
+ k, 
^1 . k2 + 
R def J . (1-r) Q. t k. I k! + „ ) ® J-1 (4-3-49) 
t Q + + gjP Cp + Y + It) ^ C f  +  
q-tvtt) ]•»••> c X'X ' •? 
R def j-
C + gf + g^ C + Y + M-) 3 
(1-r) n 
c + d 
n n 
R def j-1 n 
+ gf + g„' g ^  
r .  8  1  ^ 1  
^ + y + iiy \f + h^y \p + y + iiy J 
Dividing through by R def j-1, 
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*def'j-l = V = (1-r) { kl + kg + k, + Hp (4.3-50) 
[Cg + gf + gj) C + Y +P') Cf + 
df + t£ r  + _  
V p + Y + nVJ 
K— — i r —  Lx g + gg + g^y vp + Y + M-yJ + d^ 
[C g + g% g ) (f + Y + ^ f A ) 
C D + Y + M.) ] • p f " 
Equation 4.3-50 holds for all j S 3. Consequently, 
I def 2 = V '> * def 3 = Qj,* R def 2 
R def 3 ° %* 4 = C^* R def 2 
^ ^ Qn* => R def i = R def 2. (4.3-51) 
R def i-1 X 
The total reserve deficiency is therefore given by 
R def T = R def 1 + R def 2 + Z R def i 
i=3 
00 
= R def 1 + R def 2+2 R def 2. 
i=3 ^ 
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As we have seen earlier, this infinite series converges to 
^ f since 0 < Q_*<1, The total reserve deficiency is therefore 
i. - QgW b 
R def T = R def 1 + R def 2 + ^  ^ 
= R def 1 + R def 2 
1 - Qe* 
i+i-rVsJ (4.3-52) 
G 
Once again, this expression will not be written out in its full gory 
grandeur. 
Having obtained the expression for R def T we are once again in 
a position to write out the total impacts on asset holdings of the 
government's role of G dollars worth of government securities. For 
the banks, we have; 
dC, ^  ^ , R def T (4.3-53) 
E def I + p + g G* (4.3-54) 
®bt ' -pTTTiT " def T . (4.3-55) 
The nonbank private sectors have increased their holdings of government 
and firms' securities by 
= rrf-rrL Trkr % i + (4.3-56) 
P + Y + p. 
0 
p + Y + n 
M-
* 
G 
P + g + gf + g. f *n + g + gf + 
* 
G 
f ®n 
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dG 
nt g + gf + Lp + Y + |i. R def T + (4.3-57) 
P + g + gf + 
n 
+ 8 + gf + 8„ 
dG 
ft g + gj + g^ L p + Y + P- R def T + (4.3-58) 
^ G* 
P + g + gf + g^ + g + E£ + g„ 
dF 
pt f + L p + Y + M" 
R def T (4.3-59) 
dF n 
nt f + b 
K 
n 
L p + Y + M-
R def T ] • (4.3-60) 
Summing over each sector. 
d(G +F )^ = 
p p t ë + ëf + L p + Y + |X R def T + (4.3-61) 
P + g + gf + g^ 
G + 
g * 
+ g + gf + g^ 
f + b 
n 
M-
P + Y + M-
R def T ] 
d(G +F = n 
n  n t  g  +  g ^  +  g ^ L p + Y + M -
R def T + (4.3-62) 
p + g + gf + gjj 
b r 
_2 r y. 
f  +  b ^ L p + Y + l J .  
*] g G + JL 
+ g + gf + gjj 
R def T] . 
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dG^j. = 4.3-58 
The resulting decreases in the nonbank private sectors asset hold­
ings are given by the same relations as 4.1-73 trough 4.1-82 and will 
not be repeated here (even though the expressions for d(G + and 
d(G + are not the same as in the first section of this chapter). 
The total change in the money stock, dM^^*, is given by 
° + np d(C + + d(G + 
+ dG +—I— 
35 + df + nf + tf f p + Y + M-
[ R def I] 
All the terms here are the same as those in 4.1-87 with the exception 
of ^  ^  ^ G , which represents the portion of the banks' initial purchase 
of government securities paid for by drawing down the banks' currency 
balances. In the case under discussion dM^g* is, of course, negative. 
The same arguments hold for the situation in which the government 
buys securities. Only the signs need be changed to protect the innocent; 
otherwise, the relations are identical to those above. 
We turn now to consider the effects of open market operations on 
the prices of securities (on the rates of interest). In the case under 
discussion, prices must be lowered (rates increased) on government 
and firms' securities to induce the nonbank private sectors to expand 
their holdings of these securities. The aggregate demands are: 
158 
= gY + + g^N + + gj(PX) + A^r^ (4.3-64) 
^3 = V + 4?^n + V + '^30'p • (A.3-65) 
We have omitted the banks' demand for government securities and firms' 
securities since the new price must induce the nonbank private sectors 
to absorb the appropriate amount of securities, e.g. dG^^ + dG^^ + dG^^, 
and dF + dF . Revisiting 4.3-64 and 65 in terms of only the variables 
pt nt 
directly affected by open market operations: 
°a ' *26^p *15^n 
° V + h7\ + ^ O'p-
Then it must be true that 
''«a ° %t + ''V + •'''ft = ^ 26% + V + 
= V + 4 7^ '. + 4o%' 
we know that = p p % ^ ef I + p + g + 
g + §£ + gjj ^ Q * 
H ; G —;— R def T + G and that dF . + dF . = 
p + S + gf + Sjj p + Y + H pt nt 
p + Y + 
R def T, so that 
jrfnr * def T + G* = V'p + V + (4.3-GG) 
+ A^dTj 
R def T = b dN + A,^dr + (4.3-67) 
p + Y + l J "  n  1 7  n  3 0  p  
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or p R def T + G* = (a^+ + (4.3-68) 
(hj+ b^3+ bg^) drg 
p +Y +M. * def T = b^dN + (a^^+ dr^ + (4.3-69) 
(bi7+ b^g) dr^. 
Solving 4.3-68 and 69 simultaneously yields the changes necessary in 
the rates of interest (1/dP) necessary to induce the increased holdings 
of G and F in terms of R def T, dN, and G*. 
The resulting expressions for dr^ and dr^ are quite similar to 
those derived in section 1, except for the addition of the term G*: 
g G  L p  + Y  +  a ^ Q  
^7 ^15 ^26" C a^7 + a^Q V <^^7 ^30^ 
(4.3-70) 
{T+W - (^7 + ''so) 
0 _ (87 + a^3 + agg) . U \ 
pp + Y + n (a^y + a^g) V p + Y + ^ 
b7 + b^g + b^g - (b^y + b^Q) J J 
dN 
a + { ^n •*" ^^17 ^  ^ 30) 
17 30 
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^ (°7 + =15 + *26) 
r " *17 + °30 " 11 ^  
Lb, + »15 + t26-(tl7 + 
^**17 '*' **30^ ^ 
(*17 '*' *30^ '*'7 •*• '*13 '*' '*26 " (^17 "*• ^30*] 
As in section one of this chapter, the expressions for dM^^*, dr^^*, 
and drgg* enable us to calculate the other effects of open market 
operations on the economy when combined with the various rates of change 
calculated in Chapter III. 
We will examine these other effects for the three tools of 
monetary policy in the next section. 
Summary and Conclusions—The Effects and Effectiveness 
of the Tools of Monetary Policy 
In the first three sections of this chapter we developed, with 
some rigor, expressions for the effects of the various tools of monetary 
policy on the money stock, the rate on government securities, and the 
rate on firms' securities. In this section our primary goal is to 
compare the effects of these tools and their effectiveness in combating 
both inflation and unemployment. 
First, as far as the effects of these tools are concerned, it is 
clear that changes in the rediscount rate affect the economy through 
different channels than those through which both changes in the reserve 
requirement and open market operations work. Changes in the rediscount 
rate work primarily through (when they have any impact at all) their 
inq>act on the amount of loans actually made by the banking system. 
i6i 
changes in the amount of loans in turn affects the rates charged by the 
banks as well as the aggregate demand for both the consumer and capital 
good. Changes in the money stock are not an inçortant channel through 
which the rediscount rate affects the economy. On the other hand, both 
changes in the reserve requirement and open market operations have as 
their prime avenues of influence changes in the money stock and in the 
rates on government and firms' securities. 
Second, while their effects are very similar, changes in the 
reserve requirement have one direct effect not shared by open market 
operations. Changes in r affect the amount willing to be lent per 
dollar of deposits as well as the total amount of loans supplied through 
changes in the amount of deposits. Open market operations do not 
affect the quantity of loans supplied per dollar of deposits except 
insofar as changes in rates of interest resulting from open market 
operations may change this figure. (This indirect effect is also shared 
by changes in reserve requirements.) Thus, given a particular change 
in the reserve requirement and an open market operation that both cause 
the same change in the banks' reserves, the change in r results in 
a greater change in the quantity of bank loans supplied than does the 
open market operation. 
Third, an open market operations results in both buying and selling 
of government securities by the banking system while the banks either 
only buy or only sell government securities given a change in r. This 
difference is of little importance. 
We turn now to a direct comparison of open market operations and 
changes in reserve requirements based on the relations developed in 
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the first and third sections of this chapter. The analysis will be 
* 
divided into two major parts: first, given a dr and G that produce 
equal changes in the banks reserves, what are the relationships between 
the resultant changes in the money stock, r^, and r^, and second, 
what combinations of dr and G cause an equal change in the banks' 
reserves? 
* 
The impacts of dr and G on M, r^, and are: 
«tr " rrhr K def T + + Hp (4-1-8?) 
+ dN 
a. + a^3 + a. 
^17 ®30 
r, a? + + ^ 26 _ 1 
L n a, ^ + a„„ ®nJ 
h + ^ 5 + ^ 26 I^ pn^  (^17 + ^ 30) 
dffr = { P+Î +n - ("17 + ho> 
(^7 a. - + a_,) iP " 7 15 26' C—^—1 Vp + Y + 
- dN 
r P + Y + M' a-^-j + a^Q >) -t- y -t- p/-j >, 
"7 + 'is + ^ 26 • <^17 + b^o) -1 J 
\ ("7 + ^ 15 + *26) . g 
{ \ • (''l7+''30)[ S + hs + - ('17 •*• "30)  ^  ^
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-f k' I k3 H- Hp + (4.3-63) 
*5 + d 
dG^ + —-rr R def T + 
+ d^ + "f p +Y +M' 
J- * 
Y +p. 
[ 
d r  * <  H  . ^ l  +  d  [ - ( ' V L ^ l l l ^  
gG \f +Y +^y J n LV + a^Q V 
\ - «n + G*] 
(4.3-70) 
17 "30 
(^17 + bgo) 
"'fG* = ^^7% ( r4?7 - + ^3o> 
0 _ a? + a^^ + ^ 26 f K ^ 
p + Y + IJ. *17 + ^ 30 ^ P + Y + M-A > 
L ^7 ^15 ^26 " (^17 bgo) -' •' 
®17 "*" ^30 ^ (^17 ^30) 
<*7 + *15 + =30) 
r *17 + *30 " n + 
L b; + hs + ^ 26 - (tl7 + ^ 30) J ^ 
^17 + ^ 30 
(*17 *30) ^ ^7 "*" ^15 ^26 " (^17 ^30^] 
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Comparison of dM^^* and dM^^ shows the two expressions to be 
Y * (superficially) identical with the exception of the term ' G in 
Y T" 
dM This term is the banks' initial change in its currency holdings 
uG 
as a result of its first purchase or sale of government securities. If 
we can be sure that equal changes in reserves imply equal changes in 
the nonbank private sectors holdings of government and firms' securities, 
then it would seem, even though G*and dr resulted in an equal change 
ic 
in reserves, that G had a greater impact on the money stock. To be 
sure of this conclusion, we must examine the relations between the 
terms d(G+F)p^, d(G+F)^^, and dG^ in the two equations. These terms 
are given by: 
' g 4- s' H- [ TTfm ^ ^ 
2 G*1 + g Q* 
p + g + g^ + g^ J p + g + gf + g^ 
+ f-l-b; [ p + % + w R 
= s + I] + [ TrfrU K def ? + 
— B G*1 H — G* 
p + 8 + gf + g„ J p + g + gf + gjj 
b 
+ f-î-b; [ p + 5 + % def 
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'  g + X - f  s j p  + Y  T + (4.3-5») 
=1 G 1 + : -2; G* 
P + g + gf + -J + g + gf + g^ 
d(G+F) (p + P ^ R def T - dGg,) (4.1-71) 
ptr g + gf + gj^ 
+ f + b Cp + Y + 
"(G+f)ntr = g + s, Clp-^innr* def T _ dG^,) (4.1-72) 
f  +  b C p  +  Y  +  M -  ^  
n 
""ftr = irtT+i; ^ • "Gg.) 
Comparison of these terns shows unambiguously that d(G+F) * > 
p uG 
d(G+F)pj.^, d(G-KF)^^g* >d(G-KF)^^^, and dG^^Q* ^^is is not 
surprising as one of the chief characteristics of open market operations 
is that they change the total amount of government securities held by 
the private sectors, while changing r does not have this effect (except 
to the extent the government decides as a matter of policy to either 
buy or sell governments in conjunction with the change in r). Consequently, 
ic 
we can conclude unambiguously that, when G and dr result in the same 
change in banks' reserves, that the impact of G on the money stock will 
be larger than that of dr. Furthermore, comparison of the expressions 
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for dr^. and dr also shows that dr „* > dr and dr^^* ^  dr^ . Thus, 
f g gG gr fG fr ' 
we can conclude that, even though both dr and G result in the same change 
* 
in the reserves of the banking system, G (an open market operation) 
ic 
will have a greater impact on the level of exonomic activity since G 
1 
results in greater changes in M, r^ and r^ than does dr. 
The next question to which we turn is what combination of dr and 
* 
G result in an equal change in banks' reserves. The expressions for 
the total change in banks' reserves are: 
R def T = R def 1 + R def 2 + R def 3(1+ _ ^ ^  ) (4.3-61) 
r r r r 1 - ^ ' 
R def Tg* = R def 1^* + R def 2^* [l + (4.3-52) 
where = Q^* - dr, so that 
when dr < 0, (1 + j ) > (1 + ^  J ^  ^  and vice-versa 
^G 
when dr > 0. 
Rather than base this analysis on a complete investigation of R def T^ 
and R def 1* we shall assume that we can get an accurate approximation 
G 
of the answer from a comparison of the first changes in the banks' reserves. 
Hje do not mean to stress these differences between changes in the 
reserve requirements and open market operations at the expense of 
institutional differences which the model does not take into account. 
Some of these differences are the fact that open market operations work 
slowly relative to changes in reserve requirements, the possibility 
that bankers view reserves created by changes in reserve requirements 
differently than reserves generated by open market operations, etc. 
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R def 1^ = dr(D + T) 
k, + k. 
R def Ig* (1 - r) + k2 + kg + rip) C + g + ^ 
f__!L_) G* + 
5 + "^f + "f + ^ + g + gf + g^ 
C + g + gf + g„) ] 
Thus, for R def 1 to equal R def 1 * , it must be true that 
r t 
* 
G_ D + T 
° y s 
Lx k^ + kg + kg + Hp/ v. + ë + ëf + 
^ Z' ëx 
(4.4-1) 
r f f .y !f ^ 
V. a^ + df + Hf + tf/ V + 8 + gf + gy 
r .-) ( !n -) 
v c  + d  + b y \)4-g + g^ + gy 
The denominator of 4.4-1 is clearly less than one. Call it dem. 
Then to produce the same first change in reserves as a one percentage 
point change in r, open market operations in an amount equal to 
:ôî - (0 + T) dis = G* = -"i® + T) dl: (4-4-2) 
* 
must be undertaken. The exact size of this G depends, of course, on 
the sizes of the parameters in the denominator of 4.4-1 and on the size 
of D + T. Even though it is recognized that only looking at the first 
reserve change probably provides an inaccurate answer to our question, 
4.4-2 certainly underscores the strength of changes in the reserve 
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"k 
requirement as a monetary tool when one considers the size of G necessary 
to produce the same first change in reserves as a 1 percentage point 
change in r. 
We conclude this comparison of changes in r and open market opera­
tions by noting that an open market operation smaller than the G in 
4.4-2 will produce the same change in the money stock and in the rates on 
securities as does a 1 percentage point change in r. This is obvious 
ïV 
since we have already shown that a G which causes the same total change 
in reserves as a particular dr will have a greater impact on M, r^. and 
r^ than the change in the reserve requirement. This observation also 
* 
underscores the strength of dr since a G of substantial size would have 
to be undertaken to produce equivalent changes in M, r^, and r^. 
We turn now to a consideration of the effectiveness of these tools 
of monetary policy in combatting the problems of inflation and unemploy­
ment. With regard to changes in the rediscount rate. Table 10 shows 
that the only circumstances in which it has any impact on the economy 
are when there is an excess demand for bank loans. Typically, excess 
demand situations would correspond to periods of inflation while one 
of the characteristics of unemployment would be an excess supply of 
bank loans. Thus, we can conclude that changes in the rediscount rate 
will be particularly ineffective in combatting unemployment. The 
effectiveness of this tool is limited to combatting inflation. Even 
here, the impact of any changes in r^ is likely to be small. 
This asymmetry of the affects of changes in the rediscount rate is 
not shared by changes in the reserve requirement and open market operations. 
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As indicated earlier, the arguments above, though framed in terms of 
reductions in total reserves, hold equally well for changes in r and 
open market operations aimed at increasing the reserves of the banking 
system. Thus, there is little to choose between changes in reserve 
requirements and open market operations when faced by either unemployment 
or inflation.^ The equations below measure the impact of changes in r 
and open market operations on the variables of the economy, and 
illustrate the channels through which these tools operate in achieving 
their results. 
The immediate inçact on Y as a result of either dr or G is the 
sum of three effects; (1) the iiqpact on Y of the change in the money 
'k 
stock resulting from dr or G ; (2) the inçact on Y of the change in 
* 
r^ resulting from either dr or G ; and the impact on Y of the change 
in r^ resulting from either dr or G . Thus we can write: 
dYf = la dr^r + ^  dr^p (4.4-3) 
= "i drgg*. (4.4-4) 
Similar expressions can be written out for the effects on X^, X^, 
and 
1 
Except institutional factors vAiich, it has been argued, prevent 
fractional and frequent changes in the reserve requirement. These 
arguments have no economic validity, but are probably valid from other 
points of view. 
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ôx ... ôx . . 
®c(k)r(G*) = «r(G*) + -âîf^ + <4.4-5) 
^^c(k)r(G*) - '^•^£(G*) + (4.4-6) 
where the terms in the parentheses are used to indicate the other 
variables for which separate equations could be written. Equations 
4.4-5 and 4.4-6 actually represent eight different expressions. 
Rather than reproduce the explicit forms of all the relations 
4.4-3 through 4.4-6, we will present only that one for 4.4-3 as an 
illustration. 
|- ôx bp axl bp ôtt, ôtt 
d^r = L 35^^ ^c + Sûr %c + 35- + 35- Xk +"50- + "5%^ 
ôg ôr ôr ôt Br ôn 
'g Smf + Swf Gp + sgS- Tp + + 3^2 Np + + 
Br Bf / BR Bl Br 
3%rFp + If - l. -55- ^ bf + -55- ^ bf + -5#- ^ nf + 
Bm nfyj Lp + Y + M» 
a.  ^ t 
d(G+F)p^ 4. d(G+F),, %t] + 
r Bx Bp Bx, Bp Bit, Bn 
[ 37: ^c + 3F: Xc + 37: ^k + 37: %k + 37:+3F: + 
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+;;; ^  +;r^ rc+rg^Np +3^2 ^  + 
^][ 
nt 
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The complexity of this equation speaks for itself. It clearly 
illustrates, however, the pervasive influence of the changes in M, r^ 
and r^ associated with (in this case) a change in the reserve requirement, 
It should be noted at this point that the relations 4.4-3 through 
* 
4.4-6 actually understate the effects of dr and G on the pertinent 
variables in the model. The basic reason for this is that they ignore 
such things as (for example) the impact on prices and outputs of changes 
in the other rates of interest (other than r^ and r^) induced by changes 
in M, r^ and r^. Furthermore, the change in Y itself will induce 
another round of changes in M and the other variables in the model. 
These second, third, and higher generation changes are not contained 
in 4.4-3 through 4.4-6. This does not mean that their impacts cannot 
be measured (although it is a nasty, messy job). For example, consider 
the effects of the original changes in Y, dY^; r^, dr^^; and r^, dr^^ 
on the money stock. The 'feecond-generation" change in M is given by 
= 3# dffr + If" ^ ^  + (^'^-S) 
r g or 
5» p. M +52 |Ldr 
where the last two terms reflect the impact of changes in other rates 
on M induced by changes in r^ and r^, while the third from last term 
captures the effects of changes in M on M. To answer the question of 
the total size of the second and higher generation effects, one would 
have to again resort to finding the general terms for several infinite 
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series and then testing these series for convergence. This has not 
been done, primarily because the model has, hopefully, been formulated 
in such a way that the majority of the impact on the economy is 
captured by the relations 4.4-3 through 4.4-6. 
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CHAETER V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Monetary Mechanism 
By the term "monetary mechanism" we mean the complex web of causal 
relations through which interest rates, prices, and real phenomena 
react to determine the money stock as well as the chain of causality 
running in the opposite direction--the impact of the stock of money on 
the real and financial variables of the economy. The model constructed 
in Chapter II has enabled us to examine both of these facets of the 
monetary mechanism. 
Based on our identity for the money stock (see Equation 3.1-3) we 
derived expressions for the rates of change in M with respect to the 
key variables of the model. These expressions were of the form 
where Z is any interest rate, price, real output, or income. From 
5.1-1 we conclude that a change in any of these variables affects the 
stock of money through its impact on prices (P), real output (X), 
income (Y), and the various rates of interest. The terms through 
are in a sense "money multipliers." They tell us by how much the 
money stock changes given a change in the variables with which they 
are associated. (See Tables 3 through 7 and the associated discussion 
for a complete description and interpretation of these terms.) We 
have thus developed a specific money multiplier for each of the key 
variables in the model. The Brunner-Meltzer and Teigen models develop 
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only a single money multiplier while the C's are only some of several 
"multipliers" we have developed. (Other multipliers include the Q's 
developed in our analysis of the effects of changes in reserve 
requirements and open market operations.) 
The next step in the analysis of this facet of the monetary 
mechanism was an exploration of the specific terms on the right-hand 
side of 5.1-1. We showed how each of these terms could be derived 
and upon what variables they depend. The thirteen equations of the 
form 5.1-1 coupled with the description of the terms on the right-
hand sides of these equations provided in Chapter III constitute 
a complete description of the facet of the monetary mechanism where 
the chain of causality runs from the variables of the economy to the 
stock of money. 
Due to the general equilibrium nature of our approach and the 
addition of more sectors and variables we are able to provide a greater 
wealth of detail and a more comprehensive description of how the 
money stock reacts to changes in the economy than any of the other 
extant studies of the money supply. We have spelled out the specific 
behavioral functions and built from these whereas the other studies 
only indicate somewhat fuzzily upon what variables the terms in their 
money supply functions depend.^ 
de Leeuw's model is exempt from most of this criticism, since 
it is a simultaneous model built on specific behavioral equations. 
176 
The major advance provided by this portion of our study is the 
explicit demonstration of the links between the variables in the model 
and the money stock. We have clearly displayed these links rather than 
hiding the guts of this portion of the monetary mechanism behind 
highly simplified identities for the money stock of the sort developed 
by Friedman and Schwartz, Brunner and Meltzer and Teigen or behind a 
logically inconsistent equation as developed by de Leeuw. 
Our addition of an examination of the links running from the money 
stock to the variables of the model represents an important advance 
over extant studies. We have described and analyzed expressions for 
az ^ 
^ where Z again is any variable (price, interest rate, income, 
0 M. 
output) in the model. This analysis serves the extremely useful 
purpose of persuading us that a study of the monetary mechanism is 
iiiq>ortant since changes in M will impact on the real and financial 
variables of the economy. We have shown that the impact of M on real 
outputs operates through the effects of changes in M on income,prices, 
and interest rates, thus affecting both the demand and supply of goods. 
Even if we assume that all demand functions are homogeneous of degree 
zero in all their arguments (which we have not done), a change in the 
money stock will result in a shift in demands, since the change in 
M will not, in general, produce equi-proportional changes in the P's, 
^One serendipitous feature of our analysis was a different proof 
of the quantity theory and a demonstration that interest rate effects 
on demand and supply may weaken the direct relation between money and 
prices (see Chapter III, pp.86-119) and the importance of downward 
sloping demand curves for the quantity theory to hold. 
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Y's, and r's. The same argtment can be made with regard to shifts in 
9X 
supply. Thus, the only circumstances in which the 's will be zero 
is if the shifts in supply and demand exactly balance each other out. 
There is no reason to suppose that this in general will be the case. 
The Tools of Monetary Policy 
The model was used to analyze the effects and the effectiveness of 
the major tools of monetary policy—open market operations, changes in 
the reserve requirements, and changes in the rediscount rate—in 
combating both inflation and unemployment. 
Changes in the rediscount rate were found to be almost completely 
ineffective in combating problems of unemployment (characterized by 
an excess supply of bank loans from unborrowed reserves). It was 
only somewhat effective in helping to solve problems of inflation 
(when there is likely to be an excess demand for bank loans). In 
these situations changes in the rediscount rate affect the amount of 
rediscounting and thus the actual amount of loans made by the bank. 
Changes in the amounts of bank loans made potentially change the 
demand for the consumer and capital good, thus impacting upon the 
level of economic activity. The implication of these conclusions 
is to cast more doubt on the usefulness of discretionary changes in 
the rediscount rate as a monetary tool, especially in combating 
problems of unençloyment. 
The effects of open market operations and changes in the reserve 
requirement on the variables of the model were a result of their 
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primary effect on the money stock, the rate on government securities, 
and the rate on firms' securities. Their effectiveness in combating 
inflation depends on the size of 
Caf  +  îé) % + (5.2-1) 
(% + %) • 
Their effectiveness in combating unemp1oyment depends on the size of 
Csr  + < î r  + 
(% • 
where the differentials refer to the changes in M, r^, and r^ caused 
by either of the two monetary tools. The sizes of the partial 
derivatives are independent of the particular monetary tool used, 
consequently one tool can accomplish the same results as the other. 
The major differences between the two tools were found to be: 
1. Open market operations cause an immediate change in the 
total size of the private sectors asset portfolio by 
changing the total amount of government securities held 
by the private sectors while changes in the reserve require­
ment, while indirectly changing the size of the private 
asset portfolio (through its impact on C, D, and T), does 
not have this direct effect. 
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2. Changes in the reserve requirement change the quantity of bank 
loans supplied per dollar of deposits while open market 
operations lack this effect. 
As a result of these major differences we found that, given an open 
market operation and a change in the reserve requirement that produce 
the same total change in the reserves of the banking system, the open 
market operation has a greater impact on both the money stock and on 
the rate on government securities.^ We also developed a way of finding 
combinations of open market operations and changes in the reserve 
requirement that produce the same change in total reserves. This 
formulation added to our belief that changes in reserve requirements 
are an extremely powerful tool of monetary policy because of the 
very large open market operation that would have to be undertaken to 
produce the same effects as the change in the reserve requirement. 
Suggested Empirical Testing Procedure 
Empirical testing of the model and its conclusions will be centered 
about the estimation of the elements of the vectors A^, i = 1, 2, ..., 
30 and the other parameters of the model. Once estimates for these 
parameters are obtained, numerical estimates of the various multipliers 
can be obtained. 
^This conclusion on interest rate effects seems to contradict 
the findings of Ascheim (2). He found that given an equal reduction in 
deqiand deposits, a higher reserve requirement would produce a greater 
increase in interest rates than a restrictive open market operation. 
It is not clear that his analysis, framed in terms of equal changes 
in demand deposits, and ours in terms of equal changes in reserves are 
directly conçarable. 
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The second level of testing will center about estimation of the 
accuracy of the rates of change and total changes predicted by the 
modél. How do our predictions "fit" with changes in M and other variables 
actually observed? 
It is felt that regression analysis and one and two stage least 
squares should comprise the bulk of the statistical techniques to be 
used. The data to which the model will be fit will be that used by 
the Brookings-SSRC model. 
Completion of this portion of the work will provide an empirical 
judgment of the conclusions of the work which, to this point, are 
based strictly on theory and a few assumptions about the signs, but 
not the magnitudes, of the parameters of the model. 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a list of the major symbols used in the model and 
their definitions: 
r = the reserve requirement on demand and time deposits; 
r^ = the rate of interest on firm's securities; 
r^ = the rate of interest on government securities; 
r^ = the rate of interest on deposits in intermediaries; 
r^ = the rate of interest on time deposits; 
r^^ = the rate of interest on bank loans to firms; 
r^p = the rate of interest on bank loans to the public; 
r^^ = the rate of interest on intermediary loans to firms; 
r^p = the rate of interest on intermediary loans to the public; 
r^ = the rediscount rate; 
r^ = the coupon rate on government securities; 
If - ('f. 'g. 'bf. 0' °y-
'b ° (ff' 'g- 'f fbf' 
V 'g' 'nf V' 
'p = Cf 'g- 'c 'bp-
dr = a policy determined change in reserve requirements; 
A- = (i = 1, 2, 30) = column vector of constants 
~ ^i' ^ i' *^1' ^i' ^ i' ^ i' ^ i^' 
A^ = vector of firms assets; 
C = currency; 
D = demand deposits; 
= stock demand for capital; 
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dK = flow demand for capital; 
Dj0 = demand for labor; 
DA^ = desired distribution of firms' financial assets; 
DE^ = desired distribution of firms' retained earnings; 
d '= actual amount of rediscounting; 
d*^ = amount of rediscounting demanded; 
d^ = amount of rediscounting demanded to meet public's demand for loans; 
d^ = amount of rediscounting demanded to meet firm's demand for loans; 
dZg = change in asset Z resulting from a change in the banks' 
holdings of government securities; 
dZ = change in asset Z resulting from a change in the banks' 
^ holdings of government securities; 
dZ^^ = change in sector k's holdings of asset Z resulting from a 
change in sector k's holdings of asset 1; 
dZ^ = total change in asset Z; 
dZ^^ = total change in asset Z resulting from a change in reserve 
requirements; 
dZ^g* = total change in asset Z resulting from an open market operation; 
= total change in the money stock resulting from a change in 
reserve requirements; 
* = total change in the money stock resulting from an open 
market operation; 
dr = change in interest rate r resulting from a change in reserve 
xr T ^ X 
requirements; 
dr * = change in interest rate r resulting from an open market 
operation; 
= actual stock of firms' retained earnings; 
E^ = desired stock of firms' retained earnings; 
F = firms' debt instruments (securities); 
= firms' demand for financing; 
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g 
F = firms' supply of new securities; 
G = government securities; 
* 
G = an open market operation; 
G = full value of government securities held by the private sectors; 
g 
G = supply of government securities; 
(P = demand for government securities; 
= gross investment; 
I = net investment ; 
n 
K = capital stock; 
k = rate of growth of the capital stock; 
L = amount of labor in the economy; 
= amount of labor used to produce the consumer good; 
= amount of labor used to produce the capital good; 
= total bank loans; 
= total intermediary loans; 
Lp = total loans to the public; 
= total loans to the firms; 
Lp = bank loans to the public; 
= bank loans to the firms; 
Lp = intermediary loans to the public; 
Lj = intermediary loans to the firms ; 
= firms aggregate demand for loans ; 
Db 
= firms demand for bank loans; 
Lj" = firms demand for intermediary loans; 
Lp = public's aggregate demand for loans; 
= public's demand for bank loans; 
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= public's demand for intermediary loans; 
= banks' loan supply from unborrowed reserves; 
= amount banks are willing to loan the public from unborrowed 
^ reserves; 
—Sb 
Ig = amount banks are willing to loan the firms from unborrowed 
reserves; 
L = aggregate amount intermediaries are willing to lend; 
Lp = aggregate amount intermediaries are willing to lend the public; 
= aggregate amount intermediaries are willing to lend the firms; 
M = the money stock; 
m = the number of consumer good firms; 
N = deposits in intermediaries; 
n = the number of capital good firms; 
= the price of the consumer good; 
= the price of the capital; 
P X -
Qg* = the ratio of successive reserve changes resulting from an open 
market operation; 
Q = the ratio of successive reserve changes resulting from a change 
in reserve requirements; 
R = required reserves; 
g 
R = secondary reserves; 
R def = reserve deficiency; 
R def^ = total reserve deficiency; 
Ic 
s = stock supply of capital; 
= supply of labor; 
s = flow supply of capital ; 
T = time deposits; 
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= tax receipts; 
t = marginal rate of taxation; 
= the consumer good; 
Xj^  = the Capital good ; 
= amount of the capital good used in the production of the 
^ consumer good; 
Xj^ = amount of the capital good used in the production of capital; 
Y = public's disposable money income; 
Y = gross money income; 
Y^ = banks' contribution to income : 
Yg = firms' contribution to income; 
Y^ = intermediaries contribution to income; 
Yg = government's contribution to income; 
a = rate of depreciation; 
= X^ and X^ intercepts of the transformation curve; 
X = rate of growth of the labor force; 
0 = profit expectation function for the firms; 
TT^ = total banks' profits; 
= banks' profit from loans; 
= banks' profit from government securities; 
TTp^ = banks' profit from firms' securities; 
TT^ = total intermediaries' profit; 
= intermediaries' profit from loans; 
= intermediaries' profit from government securities; 
TT = intermediaries' profit from firms' securities. 
192 
Any Greek letter or lower case English letter not listed above 
(with or without subscripts) represents a parameter in a decision 
function for a particular sector. 
